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REBUILDING THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION:
THE RIGHT TO HOLD A CONVENTION AS
A TEST CASE
Stephen E. Gottlieb*
The Supreme Court has said that there is a constitutional right
of association.1 Such a right must be most significant in the political
area.2 Yet regulation of political parties has proceeded to such an
extent that it is difficult to identify the sphere protected by that
right.3 The selection and apportionment of delegates to political
meetings appear to be protected, yet Congress and the states are permitted to strip political meetings of most of their functions through
finance laws and primaries.' The Court's attention has generally
been focused on the justification for regulation rather than on the
* Professor of Law, Albany Law School of Union University. B.A., Princeton, 1962;
LL.B., Yale Law School, 1965. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors
James Ceaser, William Crotty and Robert M. Bastress, Jr. who read the manuscript with care
and made some excellent suggestions, to his research assistants Linda Oldfield, who also provided some excellent editorial suggestions, Gail Klein and David Born, and to his students in a
course on Elections and Political Campaigns for whom some of these ideas were developed and
who responded with some excellent ideas of their own. The author wishes to express a great
debt of gratitude to his teacher, the late Harold Lasswell. Though I have made no attempt to
employ his language, I have benefitted greatly from his encouragement, his demand that we
transcend the comforts of myopia and the analytical tools he developed to help one do it. For
example, see H.D. LASSWELL & A. KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 55-73 (1950).
1. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
2. See Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RESEARCH J. 521.
3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 constitutional and part unconstitutional).
4. Compare Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107 (1981) (open primary law improperly conflicted with party rules); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Ohio's requirement for creating and filling numerous party offices and structures violates first amendment rights) with Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191
(1979) (statutory definition of a party committee constitutional since no political functions
were assigned by statute, implying, perhaps, a protected sphere). A large number of the states
have adopted statutes patterned after the Federal Election Campaign Act. See AMERICAN
LAW DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND
STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW-SUMMARIES

(1976).
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functions and needs of the parties.5 That approach has left little
more than a shell of the traditional parties. Stripped of their ability
to select or advocate their nominees, 6 the parties have been largely
limited to formal functions and assistance to candidates in general
election campaigns.
Judicial acceptance of legislative regulation of the parties contrasts sharply with criticism by political scientists. Such a difference
of view might seem insignificant as a legal matter were it not for the
fact that dismantling institutions protected by the first amendment
requires the strongest justification." The complaints of our colleagues
in political science not only undermine the justification for regulation
but underscore the constitutional significance of parties. Such complaints cannot be lightly cast aside. Indeed, both Congress and the
parties are taking those complaints quite seriously. Opposition to the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) and efforts to abolish it stalled
congressional authorization of the FEC's budget and resulted in the
appointment of a committee to study the FEC.9 During the past
summer, the Democratic Party adopted a revised set of delegate selection rules that reduce the role of the primaries in the selection
process.10
This paper develops a coherent theory of the right of association. To focus the discussion this paper concentrates on the primary
election laws, both because the major decisions have been made in
that context and because the mindsets developed in that area have
blurred understanding the many conflicts between election law and
the Constitution. Use of the primary system has spread because it
seems to make politics accountable to the ordinary citizen. 1 But
5. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.
at 124-25, 124 n.28.
6. For example, N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-104 (McKinney 1978) provides for a convention
but submits the nomination to a primary while N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 2-126 (McKinney 1978)
prohibits spending on behalf of candidates during the primary campaign. Such spending is
plainly essential to effective speech. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15-19 (1976).
7. See, e.g., J. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 297-303 (1979); G. JACOBSON,
MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); V.0. KEY, JR., AMERICAN STATE POLITICS
165-96 (1956); J. KIRKPATRICK, DISMANTLING THE PARTIES (1978). See THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM UNDER STRONG AND WEAK PARTIES (P. Bonomi, J. Burns & A.

Ranney eds. 1981) for a spirited discussion on closely related issues.
8. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
9. See CAMPAIGN PRAc. REP., August 3, 1981, at 1-3.
10.

See DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESI-

DENTIAL NOMINATION

15-17 (1982).

11.

Thelen, Two Traditionsof ProgressiveReform, PoliticalParties,and American Democracy, in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM UNDER STRONG AND WEAK PARTIES,
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there has always been criticism that the resulting American political
system does not place politics in responsible hands.1 2 Those critics
question the wresting of party power from the political professionals.
But the point developed below will differ from both the populist support of primaries and the elitist effort to narrow popular participation. This paper demonstrates that the primary system is not democratic, and that its undemocratic aspects reflect a failure to
implement the first amendment properly. For the people to exercise
their vote in an effective way, it is necessary that they have the benefit of such organization of the electoral process that would yield
manageable, meaningful choices. In a fragmented system, even well
informed voters can have little idea of what they are voting for and
of what the consequences of their vote may be. Similarly, election
victors in such a system may take refuge among a multitude of issues to vitiate any mandate. 13
The problems of political chaos suggest that we have ignored
the first amendment's teaching that the right of association must be
protected. Can we, however, accept that teaching without inviting
the return of those political abuses which had long been the scourge
of American politics? 14 Under a system of relatively unregulated organization, would not abuse of power replace political chaos as the
major problem?
To answer these questions this paper will develop a model that
emphasizes choice among existing organizations and entry of new.
ones. 15 To maximize public control of government and minimize the
aggregation of power over the voters, the paper will urge that it is
preferable to allow all organizations access to equivalent resources
on equitable terms so that reasonable entry and competition are possible, rather than to restrain and rechannel the exercise of first
amendment rights. Voters must be permitted to organize, as long as
organization does not prevent counter-organization.
supra note 7, at 37.
12. See J. CEASER, supra note 7, at 39-40; J.

KIRKPATRICK,

supra note 7, at 6-7.

Learned Hand once wrote in TIE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 93 (1952) that the vote was
one of the most unimportant events of his life; cf. A. RArNNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFs OF
FACTION 128 (1975) (the most important criteria for voters is their preference for a particular
13.

party).
14. Still the most delightful study of the abuses in politics is MARK TWAIN & C.
WARNER, THE GILDED AGE (1974). For a statistical examination of the effect of party politics
on voting, see Converse, Change in the American Electorate, in THE HUMAN MEANING OF
SOCIAL CHANGE 263 (A. Campbell & P. Converse eds. 1972). For a more descriptive study of
political abuses, see A. STEINBERG, THE BOSSES (1972).
15. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1950).
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This paper fashions a coherent theory of the rights of organizations out of these concepts. Part I identifies the values courts have
found in political association and seeks to explain the limits of their
view. Part II explores the protected functions of political association.
Part III examines the corruption rationale that has been used to
override associational choice, and Part IV explores the effect of election law on the expressive functions of parties.
Several conclusions appear justified on the basis of this analysis.
First, aspects of the primary process which provide a counting mechanism must be separated from those which suppress organized expression.1 The combination of restrictions on convening and
campaigning in the primary do not appear consistent with the right
of association because they effectively silence the parties, and because they do not operate neutrally among contending groups and
ideological positions. 17 Second, the major constitutional check on the
abuses of political associations is the right to associate in opposition.
Restraints on parties that frustrate organized opposition, aggravate
the disadvantages of minor parties, or prevent organized intraparty
opposition 18 are impossible to justify. Third, and more generally, the
right of association cannot be understood without a searching analysis of the functions political associations are designed to perform.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Parties in the Eighteenth Century

The First Congress wrote the right of assembly alongside the
rights of petition and expression in the first amendment.1 9 Both the
language and the history of the amendment suggest that a right of
association was intended. The Constitution, as it emerged in 1787,
included numerous provisions designed to protect political opposition.20 Political organizations were well developed, and both caucuses
and party conventions had been held before the drafting of the first
16. See infra text accompanying notes 158-61, 255-65.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 262-65, 270-73; F. CARNEY, THE RISE OF THE
DEMOCRATIC CLUBS IN CALIFORNIA (1958) (describing the efforts of the Democratic Party to
mount an effective electoral challenge to the Republicans in the face of antiparty primary
legislation in California).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 278-79, 300.
19. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. See I ANNALS OF CONG. 760-61 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
20. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. I (speech or debate clause); id. at § 9, cl. 3 & § 10,
cl. I (attainder, ex post facto laws); id. at art. III, § 3, cl. I (regulating punishment of
treason).
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amendment.21 Likewise, Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton immediately set about to organize what were soon to become two national
parties. 2
Despite this history of support for parties, a good deal of ambivalence remained in attitudes toward association. Opposition was
strongly expressed but rebutted in the context of the formation of
the Order of the Cincinnatti 2s and the Whiskey Rebellion.2 4 This
hostility culminated in the Alien25 and Sedition2 Acts. But Madison
and Jefferson largely settled the issue of the right of association in
the Virginia27 and Kentucky2" Resolutions and the Election of
21.

F. DALLINGER, NOMINATIONS FOR ELECTIVE OFFICE IN THE UNITED STATES 1-13,

26 (1897); see id. at 21 (referring to a Federalist convention in Philadelphia in 1789).
22. See Cunningham, The Jeffersonian Republican Party, in 1 HISTORY OF UNITED
STATES POLITICAL PARTIES 239, 241-43 (A. Schlesinger, Jr. ed. 1973); J. CHARLES, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERiCAN PARTY SYSTEM 83-84 (1956).

23. For a background of the formation of the Order of the Cincinatti, see L. DUNBAR, A
STUDY OF "MONARCHICAL" TENDENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1776 TO 1801, at 52-

53 (1970).
24. See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 899-900, 921-28, 934-38 (1794); Debates in the Federal
Convention of 1787 as Reported by James Madison, in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 109, 454 (C. Tansill ed. 1927) (statement of Mr. Gerry). Also see A. RANNEY, supra note 13, at 22-57, on the expressed, but
largely restrained, hostility to parties. Lest one attempt the leap from these expressions of
hostility to a conclusion that the first amendment was not intended to protect parties, it seems
quite unjustified here. One must question what political motives led those who shortly defended partisan association to silence. Was it the absence of i perceived threat to the status
quo in the earlier periods, preoccupation with other issues, a desire to appease colleagues, or
simply a lack of considered convictions? The difficulties in interpreting legislators' motives are
discussed in A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 214-16 (1962) and J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 16-18 (1980). Compare the confusion about the meaning and content of
public opinion sampled by modern pollsters. See Gollin, Exploring the Liaison Between Polling and the Press, 44 PUB. OPINION Q. 445, 453-55 (1980). Moreover, it is a long jump even
on the part of the speaker, from his opinion on certain problems to legal, much less constitutional, conclusions. We continue simultaneously to lament and to protect misuse of freedom of
expression. The founders spoke eloquently of the right of revolution (and wrote the right of
assembly into the first amendment) but prepared to punish treason. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3,
cl. 1. In the case of partisan political association we have a record of decisions, and the vocal
but repressive forces lost. We also have a hint in Madison's writings of the more sober views
which plainly prevailed. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961). The expressions of hostility, therefore, may be good evidence that the men who drafted
and ratified the first amendment did know what they were protecting. The well thought out
views of the nation's leaders are, after all, a better guide to its considered judgment than the
hot-tempered complaints of others.
25. Ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); Ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798); Ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
26. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
27. Virginia Resolutions of 1798, in 4 TE DEBATES INTHE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836); I.
BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 275-77 (1965).
28. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, in 4 THE DEBATES IN TIm SEVERAL STATE
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1800.9 Not long thereafter, the two-party system became accepted
dogma at the highest levels of American statecraft.30
B.

Treatment of Parties in State Courts

The historical recognition of the importance of political parties
has led one notewriter to comment that "[ihe preferred position of
political parties in the law was so firmly established by the end of
the nineteenth century that state attempts to establish a mandatory
party structure or an open nominating procedure were regularly
struck down as invasions of the party's right to regulate its internal
affairs." 31 Thus, in Stephenson v. Boards of Election Commissioners,32 the Michigan court cautioned against state regulation of the
parties, fearing that it might hamper the repudiation of corruption
and fraud. In California, primary laws were invalidated as constituting special legislation in Marsh v. Hanley, 3 as unconstitutionally defining voter eligibility in Spier v. Baker,34 and, in Britton v. Board of
Election Commissioners,"5 as effectively destroying parties by allowing members of one party to vote in the primary of the other.
The courts in that period, however, did not entirely avoid the
resolution of political controversies. Courts were inevitably drawn in
where competing factions each claimed the right to use the party
label on the primary or general election ballot. By simply printing all
the claimed nominations on the ballot, many courts tried to force the
parties to settle their own disputes." In another large group of cases,
the courts enforced party rules concerning qualifications to sit as a
member of a party convention.3
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,

supra note 27,

at

540.

29. See Cunningham, supra note 22, at 253-54; J.SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETTERS 431-33
(1956).
30. See generally J.CEASER, supra note 7, at 123.
31. Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to NationalPolitical
Conventions, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 148, 153 (1970) (footnote omitted).
32. 118 Mich. 396, 400-01, 76 N.W. 914, 915 (1898).
33. 111 Cal. 368, 43 P. 975 (1896).
34. 120 Cal. 370, 52 P. 659 (1898).
35. 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900).
36.

E.g., Shields v. Jacob, 88 Mich. 164, 50 N.W. 105 (1891); Phelps v. Piper, 48 Neb.

724, 67 N.W. 755 (1896). Many of the cases are collected in Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1035, 1036-41
(1922). The primary election and petition processes for candidates, party officers and delegates
have clarified, although they have not disentangled, the courts' role in resolving internal disputes over ballot access and position. See, e.g., American Indep. Party v. Secretary of State,
397 Mich. 689, 247 N.W.2d 17 (1976). An analogue is the Court's treatment of church property disputes. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
37. E.g., Beck v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 103 Mich. 192, 61 N.W. 346 (1894);
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Resistance to intrusion in the internal affairs of political parties,
though, was by no means as universal as the above notewriter's comments suggest;18 indeed, there were three sources of interference.
One group of courts viewed intervention as improper only in the absence of "statutory regulations" or "fraud or oppression.""9 Others
resolved controversies in accord with statutory schemes that may
have required no more than that party nominations be printed, rationalizing their intrusion due to the need to prevent fraud from affecting the administration of these statutes.4 0 A third source of intrusion
was accomplished over the judges' heads: Some state constitutions
41
actually required a primary.
No federal constitutional issue was implicated in these early
cases. This period was decades before the United States Supreme
Court wrote any teeth into the first amendment.4 2 State constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to speak, assemble, and petition, however, were ubiquitous, 43 and the import of parties was common coin. 4 In Ex parte Wilson,45 Judge Furman wrote: "These
wicked machinations [of secret combines of wealth] cannot be defeated by independent individual efforts. .

.

. [T]he people must or-

ganize into political parties. ' 46 The majority in State ex rel. McState ex rel. O'Malley v. Lesueur, 103 Mo. 253, 15 S.W. 539 (1891). For a comprehensive
treatment of judicial intervention into association matters, see Developments in the
Law-Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1963).

38. See Note, supra note 31, at 153.
39.

See Ferguson v. Montgomery, 148 Ark. 83, 229 S.W. 30 (1921); People ex rel.

Eaton v. District Court, 18 Colo. 26, 31 P. 339 (1892); Phillips v. Gallagher, 73 Minn. 528, 76
N.W. 285 (1898).

40. See Williams v. Lewis, 6 Idaho 184, 54 P. 619 (1898), overruled on other grounds
in Stein v. Morrison, 91 Idaho 426, 75 P. 246 (1904); State ex rel. Garn v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 167 Ind. 276, 78 N.E. 1016 (1906); State ex rel. Wolfe v. Falley, 9 N.D. 950, 83
N.W. 860 (1900).
41. E.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. II, § 2 , construed in Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776,

103 P. 181, 188 (1909); OKLA. CoNsr. art. III, § 5, construed in Ex parte Wilson, 7 Okla.
Crim. 610, 125 P. 739 (1912).

42. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47

(1919).
43. E.g., NEV. CONsT. art. I. §§ 9 (speech), 10 (assembly and petition); WASH. CONST.
art. I, §§ 4 (petition, assembly), 5 (speech). Enduring distinctions regarding rights of expres-

sion had also surfaced. See Anderson, The Formative Period of First Amendment Theory,
1870-1915, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 56, 56-60 (1980).

44. See, e.g., Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 342-44, 61 P. 1115,
1117-18 (1900) (rights of parties fundamental and essential among the rights reserved to the
people).
45. 7 Okla. Crim. 610, 125 P. 739 (1912).

46. Id. at 631, 125 P. at 748 (Furman, J., concurring).
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Grael v. Phelps4 7 considered parties fundamental to our form of
government, while Judge Timlin, in a dissenting opinion, tied their
importance "to the full and effective exercise of political power by
the people" in a "populous republic."' 8 Several courts 49 quoted at
length from James Bryce's The American Commonwealth5" on the
way Americans carry out their political functions through the medium of parties.
The courts did not find it difficult, however, to deny any conflict
between primary laws and the rights guaranteed by state constitutional provisions. In Riter v. Douglass, 1 the Nevada Supreme Court
stated that "instead of attempting to destroy [parties, the primary
law] simply regulated the means by which the efforts of political
parties should be directed.15 2 The court concluded that the legislation increased the power of the people to govern their parties.5 3 This
approach was most notable in cases where provisions defining membership in the parties for the purpose of voting in the primaries were
challenged. The courts consistently responded that those require5
ments were designed to preserve the integrity of the parties. '
Since the courts denied that great damage was being done, it
was rarely noticed that some statutes effectively were silencing the
parties. One court distinguished 5 and another struck down 56 statutes
which prevented the parties from meeting, proposing a candidate in
47. 144 Wis. 1, 16, 128 N.W. 1041, 1046-47 (1910) (quoting Britton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337, 61 P. 1115 (1900)).
48. Id. at 34, 128 N.W. at 1054.
49. E.g., Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 422, 109 P. 444, 450 (1910); State ex rel.
Webber v. Felton, 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N.E. 85, 87 (1908).
50.

1 J. BRYCE, THE

AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH

636, 638 (1889).

51. 32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910).
52. Id. at 418, 109 P. at 449. See also State ex rel. Labauve v. Michel, 121 La. 374,
390-93, 46 So. 430, 436 (1908) (upholding as constitutional the requirement that party nomination be through direct primary). The Supreme Court of Washington similarly found no constitutional basis for the objection that the law tends to destroy political parties. State ex rel.
Shepard v. Superior Court, 60 Wash. 370, 111 P. 233 (1910).
53. Rlter, 32 Nev. at 421, 109 P. at 450.
54. See Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 792, 103 P. 181, 188 (1909); Rouse v.
Thompson, 228 I1. 522, 547-48, 81 N.E. 1109, 1117-18 (1907); Gardner v. Ray, 154 Ky. 509,
519, 157 S.W. 1147, 1152 (1913); Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 433, 109 P. 444, 454
(1910); State ex rel. Miller v. Flaherty, 23 N.D. 313, 323-29, 136 N.W. 76, 80-83 (1912);
Baer v. Gore, 79 W. Va. 50, 58, 90 S.E. 530, 533 (1916). See also Hopper v. Stack, 69 N.J.L.
562, 56 A. 1 (1903), which upheld primary law provisions defining party membership because
they merely codified existing practices.
55. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 109 P. 444 (1910).
56. State ex rel. Wells v. Dykeman, 70 Wash. 599, 127 P. 218 (1912). See also Rosenberg v. Republican Party, 270 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1954).
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convention, and supporting that candidate in the primary. But most
attacks on the primary laws did not address the issue of the danger
to parties.5 A number of complaints challenged the primaries for
abridging the right to vote.5 8 Oblivious to the impact on parties, the
courts treated their state constitutional provisions as authority for,
rather than a barrier to, primary laws.5 9 In the absence of constitutional provisions defining the scope of a right to vote, courts sometimes treated voting as a mere statutory privilege.6 0 But the courts

perceived no problem with direct primaries,61 which limited the effectiveness of party conventions, or even with nonpartisan prima-

ries,6 2 which were designed to eliminate the parties. Indeed, some
courts viewed the availability of the primary as a privilege.63
Thus, the initial judicial resistance to primaries was undermined

by the superficiality of the defense of parties. While asserting that
parties had an important role to play, the courts failed to identify

how that role was affected by the statutes under consideration.
Whatever hesitancy the courts felt about involvement in the internal
operation of the political parties, they clearly capitulated to turn-of57. For example, primary laws were challenged, inter alia, as special legislation for certain communities or associations. See Marsh v. Hanley, I11 Cal. 368, 43 P. 975 (1896); Hopper v. Stack, 69 N.J.L. 562, 56 A. 1 (1903). For violation of constitutional rules of legislative
drafting, see Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 52 P. 659 (1898).
58. Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal. 370, 371, 52 P. 659, 660 (1898); Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev.
400, 410, 109 P. 444, 446 (1910); Ex parte Wilson, 7 Okla. Crim. 610, 615-17, 125 P. 739,
741 (1912).
59. Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 792, 103 P. 181, 188 (1909); Riter v. Douglass,
32 Nev. 400, 415-23, 109 P. 444, 447-49 (1910); Ex parte Wilson, 7 Okla. Crim. 610, 627,
125 P. 739, 742 (1912).
60. Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 422, 109 P. 444, 450 (1910); Healey v. Wipf, 22
S.D. 343, 348, 117 N.W. 521, 522 (1908). This view was discussed critically in State ex rel.
McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 128 N.W. 1041 (1910).
61. See, e.g., Winston v. Moore, 244 Pa. 447, 91 A. 520 (1914) (upholding mandatory
direct primary laws); Morrow v. Wipf, 22 S.D. 146, 115 N.W. 1121 (1908) (upholding
mandatory direct primary laws).
62. See, e.g., State ex rel. Binner v. Buer, 174 Wis. 120, 182 N.W. 855 (1921) (upholding nonpartisan primary law). See also Whitney v. Skinner, 194 Ky. 804, 241 S.W. 350
(1922) (upholding denial of write-in votes where nomination by nonpartisan primary process is
prerequisite to receiving votes in general election).
63. See, e.g., Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Or. 167, 66 P. 714 (1901) (upholding denial of minor
parties' participation in primary process). In Stevenson v. Hardin, 238 Ky. 600, 38 S.W.2d
462 (1931), plaintiffs even challenged, unsuccessfully, the constitutionality of a statute that
allowed parties to nominate candidates through conventions in lieu of direct primaries. In Redfearn v. Delaware Republican State Comm., 502 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (3d Cir. 1974), affd
mem. on remand, 524 F.2d 1403 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated in light of subsequent legislation,
429 U.S. 809 (1976), the court of appeals characterized the direct primary as "neutral" in its
effects on the associational rights of parties in reversing a lower court injunction regulating an
apportionment formula for state nominating conventions.
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the-century populists' efforts to purify the electoral process.64 Early
in the twentieth century, the state courts permitted state primary
laws to wrest control over party decisionmaking processes from the
party organizations.6 5
C. Rights of Parties in the Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court has considered the rights of
political parties against the background of this massive fait accompli. Limited intrusion on parties, sanctioned by the Court in early
cases, has grown into approval of regulation which sharply conflicts
with the first amendment.
The Court's first involvement with parties was in a group of
cases dealing with the white primaries. 6 The Court ruled in these
cases that it was unconstitutional for a state to exclude a racial
group from voting in the primary or to authorize a private party to
do the same. In Terry v. Adams,67 the Court extended this line of
cases to require a political association that had been active in Texas
politics for some seventy-five years, and whose choices were historically conclusive in the Democratic primary, to permit blacks to vote.
The meaning of that decision has been somewhat elusive.' One interpretation would limit the reach of Terry's regulation of parties to
matters involving racial discrimination.69 Indeed, the Terry opinions
specifically rely on the fifteenth amendment.7 0 The Supreme Court,
in O'Brien v. Brown,7 1 adhered to that approach stating, "This is not
a case in which claims are made that injury arises from invidious
discrimination based on race in a primary contest within a single
64. See Note, supra note 31, at 154. See also State ex reL McCarthy v. Moore, 87
Minn, 308, 92 N.W. 4 (1902); Mitau, Judicial Determination of Political Party Organizational Autonomy, 42 MINN. L. REV. 245, 246 (1957).
65. See generally C. MERRIAM & L. OVERACKER, PRIMARY ELECTIONS 60-66, 359-404

(1928) (describing the spread of primary legislation) and id. at 108-40 (describing the judicial
battle over the primary).
66. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overrulingGrovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S.
45 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
Earlier cases such as Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), United States v. Mosely,
238 U.S. 383 (1915) and Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) similarly involved protect-

ing the right to vote against discriminatory legislation and intimidation of black voters.
67. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
68. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 28-35 (1959).
69.

W. ELLIOTr, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN DEMOCRACY 62-63, 81 (1974).

70. 345 U.S. at 469-70. See also id. at 472-73, 476 (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 482,
484 (Clark, J., concurring).
71. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
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State. Cf. Terry v. Adams .... ,,72 This language has led some jurists to conclude that the white primary cases can not be extended
beyond their racial originsZ 3 But a racial interpretation of those
cases is really quite unsatisfying. Are the parties prohibited from excluding blacks, but free to exclude members of ethnic or religious
groups?
A right to vote in primaries, grounded either in the due process
or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, would be
more inclusive. But either interpretation of Terry still requires precise standards to distinguish what will constitute private action of
the parties from actions that will be imputed to the government and,
thus, invoke constitutional scrutiny. In Terry, Justice Black attempted to deal with that problem by focusing on the power of dominant political organizations: "The only election that has counted in
this Texas county for more than fifty years has been that held by the
Jaybirds from which Negroes were excluded. .

.

.The Jaybird pri-

mary has become an integral part, indeed the only effective part, of
the elective process . . . . ,4 The more powerful the association, the
more tainted the resulting state-run primary and general elections.
At some point, according to this approach, the state could not recognize or reflect such biased private polls in its state-run processes. The
Court, however, has not used that kind of distinction among parties
in its recent decisions regarding state action. 5 A finding of state action would involve the courts deeply in the definition of proper party
behavior. The Supreme Court shied away from defining proper party
behavior in O'Brien v. Brown7 6 and Cousins v. Wigoda,7 cases arising out of the 1972 Democratic convention. Both cases involved chal72. Id. at 4 n.1 (citations omitted).
73. See Ripon Soc'y v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 575 n.20 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976); id. at 598 (Tamm, J.,
concurring).
74. 345 U.S. at 469 (Black, J.,
joined by Douglas, Burton, JJ.). See also opinion of
Justice Clark. Id. at 484 (Clark, J.,
concurring, joined by Vinson, C.J., Reed, Jackson, JJ.).
75.

In Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) and O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1

(1972), the Court treated the party as private, or arguably private. In recent cases not involving state action, the Court approved statutory schemes which either treated all parties alike or
provided advantages to the major parties. This is inconsistent with an approach which would
impose greater burdens through the state action requirement on major parties. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1980), affid,
445 U.S. 955 (1980); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, 102
S. Ct. 1266 (1982); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
affld, 445 U.S. 955 (1980); Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 461 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y.

1978).
76. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
77.

419 U.S. 477 (1975).
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lenges to the Democratic Party's delegate selection rules, including
requirements for open slate selection meetings, proportional representation (a technical term for the allocation of seats among slates
pledged to different candidates in the ratio of their vote totals in
each state primary), and goals or quotas for racial, ethnic, and sexual representation. 78 Though these cases presented an opportunity to
do so, the Court did not delineate the rights of political associations.
In O'Brien, the Court required the litigants to present their grievances to the credentials mechanisms set up by the party, noting the
impropriety of judicial consideration in light of the short time-scale
available to the Court.7 1 In Cousins, the Court held merely that the
states did not have a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the
imposition of a method of selecting convention delegates on the parties.80 Beyond that narrow holding, the Court failed to identify a
protected sphere of party activity. That failure left open the question
arising from Terry, of the scope of a party's power to define its own
membership.
Despite the Court's cautions in O'Brien against interference in
the operations of political parties, and the limited reach of the
Court's precedents, the massive fait accompli of the primary laws,
together with the limited intrusions on parties in the white primary
cases, gave considerable legitimacy to the idea that parties are constitutionally subject to extensive legal restraints. This idea ultimately
emerged as a balancing test via Cousins and Buckley v. Valeo.81 In2
the wake of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA)
and the Amendments of 1974,83 Buckley made it clear that political
associations are subject to very extensive regulation. While the Court
identified the rights involved as "fundamental" and, according to its
precedents, promised the "closest scrutiny. . to avoid unnecessary
abridgement of associational freedoms," 8 ' it failed to adhere to that
78. See 419 U.S. at 479, 479 n.l; 409 U.S. at 2.
79. 409 U.S. at 3, 5.
80.

419 U.S. at 490-91. Compare Kester, ConstitutionalRestrictions on PoliticalPar-

ties, 60 VA. L. REV. 735, 776-80 (1974) (concluding that the national party need not respect
state laws in performing its functions) with Rotunda, Constitutionaland Statutory Restrictions on Political Parties in the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 TEx. L. REV. 935, 944-45
(1975) (concluding that Kester's concern for political party structure does not give proper
weight to competing interests).
81. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
82.

Pub. L. No. 92-225, 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (86 Stat.) 3.

83.

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 1974

U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1436 (88 Stat. 1263).

84. 424 U.S. at 25.
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standard. Instead, it rejected various overbreadth arguments on the
basis of deference to Congress, 5 and sustained most of the provisions
of the Act on the basis of a subjective balancing test.8" The Court's
decision in Buckley clouds the issue of what first amendment rights
are to be left for the parties.
D.

The Supreme Court's Individualist Philosophy of Politics

Much of the Court's failure to delineate a protected sphere for
the parties can be traced to the individualist way in which politics
has been conceptualized. Instead of encouraging associations to serve
the voters, the individualist view equalizes the personal influence of
each voter as the best way to make government fair and responsive.
Thus, the early cases treated the primaries as an aid to the parties-giving each member a voice. This view is analogous to the
model of pure competition in classical economics.8
Buckley perpetuated the idea that parties are no more than the
sum of their members. At issue was the constitutionality of FECA's
several limitations on political contributions. 8 The Court's discussion of political contributions focused on the individual: "A contribution serves as a general expression of support. . . The quantity of
the communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly
with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on
the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." 89 The Court explicitly rejected, as repugnant to the first amendment, 90 the idea of
contribution limitations as a means of equalizing the voices of the
wealthy with the less affluent and it expressly based its decision on
the need to eliminate the appearance of corruption.9 1 Nevertheless
the Court returned repeatedly to the individualist viewpoint. It expressed concern over large private contributions and a preference for
85. Id. at 27-30. Dangers of deferring to Congress are greatest in this area. See J. ELY,
supra note 24, at 105-34; Blasi, supra note 2, at 529-44.
86. 424 U.S. at 19-23, 64-68, 93-97.
87. See A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIcS 5-10 (8th ed. 1948). By this standard, America had its golden age under British rule. See descriptions of the self-nominating
and open meeting systems then in vogue in F. DALLINGER, supra note 21, at 4-7; A. RANNEY,
supra note 13, at 62.
88. 424 U.S. at 7. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976).
89. 424 U.S. at 21; see also California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 n.16
(1981) (sustaining contribution limitations to an independent multicandidate political action

committee).
90.
91.

424 U.S. at 48-49.
Id. at 26-27.
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soliciting smaller contributions from numerous people.9 2 At one point
the Court acknowledged that a primary purpose of the statute included "restricting the voices of people and interest groups who have
money to spend. ' 93 And it discounted claims of inequality among
candidates, parties, and political committees on the basis of its perceptions that the Act treats all contributors alike. 4 Even the concept
of improper influence 9 5 is not clearly distinguishable from the individualist mode.
By contrast, the Court's dismissal of the collective issue-the
impact of the limitations in aggravating overall funding imbalances
among parties, candidates, and positions-is striking. The petitioners
had presented evidence of the import of large contributions for popular causes and candidates throughout history, and specifically the
significance of large early contributions to challengers.98 The Court
was also well aware of the resources made available to incumbents
by the government, and the significant influence these resources have
on campaigns. 97 Yet, despite the impact of the contribution limitations in aggravating these imbalances, the Court found "no such evidence" 9 8 and "little indication" 99 that contribution limitations would
prejudice challengers in their contests with incumbents. It reached a
similar conclusion regarding third parties 00° while candidly admitting that "the absence of experience under the Act prevents us from
evaluating this assertion." 101 Thus, the Court was prepared to take a
substantial risk of collective inequality to satisfy a desire for individual fairness.
In accepting public funding provisions which denied aid to some
third parties, the Court again stressed an individual model of politics: "[T]he denial of public financing to some Presidential candidates
92. Id. at 106.
93. Id. at 17.
94. Id. at 31.
95. See Id. at 27.
96. Brief for Appellant at 116-38, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1971).
97. 424 U.S. at 31 n.33. See also Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir.
1980) where the court denied relief to plaintiffs who alleged that members of President
Carter's administration and the Carter-Mondale committee illegally expended federal funds to
promote the President's renomination. Id. at 134-35. Relief was denied for two reasons: first,
plaintiffs lacked standing, id. at 138; second, there were prudential limitations stemming from
the separation of powers doctrine, Id. at 141-42.
98. 424 U.S. at 32.
99. Id. at 33 n.38.
100. Id. at 33-35.
101. Id. at 34 n.40 (referring to the importance of "seed" money, the funding necessary
to launch a campaign).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/4

14

Gottlieb: Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Conventi

1982]

RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

is not restrictive of voters' rights and less restrictive of candidates'
[rights than ballot access laws]."1o2 Reducing the rights of parties to

the rights of individuals-voters and candidates-the Court treated
all aggregate problems as a mere derivative of individual contribution decisions. 103 The issue of the treatment of parties, then, was
foreclosed by the Court's initial conclusion that the individual was
fairly treated. Similarly, to reach its conclusion that voters are unaffected, the Court must have assumed that small parties, as measured
by the prior election, benefit by their preclusion from public funding,
or that the collective issue was irrelevant. Though there is some language to the effect that the Court thought third parties better off
without public funding, this rationale is hard to accept at face value
since granting public financing would not preclude a party's option
to reject the dollars.104
Buckley clearly demonstrates the Court's individualist view of
political parties and nothing the Court has said since suggests a revision in that approach.10 5 In First National Bank v. Belotti,106 the
Court held that corporations could not be precluded from making
either contributions or expenditures to advocate their views on ballot
measures. No change in the analysis of association seems to have
been intended. Building on Belotti in Citizens Against Rent Control
v. City of Berkeley,10 7 the Court distinguished limitations on contributions to candidates, which it had approved in Buckley, 0 8 from
limitations on independent expenditures and contributions to causes
other than candidates, such as advocating views on ballot measures,
which it now invalidated. 109 Supporting that decision, the Court emphasized the absence of a threat of corruption in the ballot issue
situation as opposed to the candidate contribution situation.110 It also
specifically discussed the right of association, arguing that associa102. Id. at 94.
103. Id. at 94-95.
104. Id. at 94.
105. The Court's affirmance in Common Cause v. Schmitt, 102 S. Ct. 1266 (1982), aff'g
512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), the result of an equally divided Court, suggests a willingness
on the part of four Justices to restrict associational rights even further. The lower court held
26 U.S.C. § 9012(0 (1976) unconstitutional insofar as it limited independent expenditures by
political committees unaffiliated with publicly funded presidential candidates. 512 F. Supp. at
496.
106. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
107. 102 S.Ct. 434 (1981).
108. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
109. 102 S.Ct. at 438-39.
110. Id. at 437-38.
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tion enhances effective advocacy of points of view.11 What it appears to have had in mind in this analysis was a matter of simple
addition: More money makes a louder splash. The Court then proceeded to analogize an association's first amendment rights to those
of an individual. 112 There is no sense either in Belotti or in Berkeley
of the uniqueness of associated efforts; associations are simply larger.
Perhaps this was all the analysis that was necessary to decide these
cases. Still, the protection of associational activities in Belotti and
Berkeley signals no change in the Court's failure to appreciate the
ways in which an association functions as anything more than the
sum of its members' efforts-the very failure underlying Buckley's
ratification of the contribution rules.
The Court's individualist perspective is evidenced further in
CaliforniaMedical Association v. FEC,'13 in which it upheld FECA
provisions that operated to limit the Association's contributions to its
segregated fund more narrowly than corporate or union contributions to their funds are limited.114 Still failing to appreciate the distinctive collective roles involved, the Court held, in the context of its
discussion of the equal protection claim, that the treatment of associations was at least as good as the treatment of corporations and
unions because of the freedom of the medical association to solicit
from the general public and the ability of the association to make
limited contributions and unlimited expenditures on political campaigng, rights denied to the corporations and unions.1 1 5 The Court
saw no issue in the different forms to which the two groups were
confined, measuring the statute by the degree of burden rather than
the shaping of political expression.
The Court was unable to reach a consensus on the first amendment issue. Its dispute, however, was unrelated to the functions of
association. The plurality saw only "'speech by proxy'" in the fund
and concluded it was "not the sort of political advocacy.

. .

entitled

to full first amendment protection." ' But the only thing at stake for
the plurality was "the first amendment rights of a contributor,"117
obscuring entirely the impact of the associated form on the speech.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.at 436.
Id. at 437.
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
Id. at 200-01.
Id.at 201.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197.
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Justice Blackmun, concurring, differed with the plurality over
the standard of review of contributions, but his view of the importance of contributions and their right to protection was based on the
individualist analysis of pooling and amplifying the resources of each

separate voter.11 The dissenters objected only to the jurisdictional
decision."" 9 Thus, California Medical Association v. FEC must be

read as a reaffirmation of the one-dimensional, sum-of-its-parts view
of political association. It focused only on the speech rights of the
contributor, rather than on the unique functions and the rights of the
recipient associations. 20
Election and campaign statutes generally follow this individualist model. Barriers to individual entry in primary campaigns are rel118. Id. at 203 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
119. Id. at 204, 205-09 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, Rehnquist, JJ.). Of the dissenters, all but Chief Justice Burger had joined in the Court's approval of
contribution limitations in Buckley, 424 U.S. at 5, 290.
120. This individualist view has also affected such decisions as Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), upholding the fairness doctrine. Under the fairness doctrine,
the FCC reviewed the even-handedness of the broadcast treatment of controversial issues. A
corporate approach would have deferred to the importance of the broadcasters' role in steering
public discussion and in protecting the public against the government, of which the FCC is a
part. Had it taken that kind of corporate approach, it would have treated regulation by a
government agency as the greater evil. Instead, it ignored these aggregate issues, concluding:
It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount. . . . It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee.
Id. at 390 (citations omitted).
The Court appeared to have rejected the individualist model in other first amendment
decisions involving freedom of the press. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). Both of these cases
are premised on the institutional risks to the press; this change in approach is developed at
length in Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977). But the
philosophy of those cases has not yet reached those areas of the political sphere where they
might conflict with and be used to invalidate legislation, as in the primary or campaign finance
areas. A more recent attempt to reverse this individualistic focus was laid in the area of presidential funding. The Republican National Committee sued to eliminate the restrictions on
contributions to publicly funded presidential campaigns. They argued that the restrictions limited the proper role of the parties in the campaign and put challengers at a disadvantage as
well. Plaintiffs' Brief, Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1980), at 23-29,
42-45. Public funding, however, has very different consequences than limitations on fundraising; depending on the level of funding and the formula for allowing it, public funding can
neutralize some of the inequality among contending campaigns. See generally G. JACOBSON,
supra note 7. The 1980 election made clear that challengers can do quite well on that level.
Thus presidential campaign funding may not have posed the most serious problems with the
individual perspective. In any event, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of
relief, 445 U.S. 955 (1980), and denied certiorari, 445 U.S. 965 (1980).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:191

atively low. 121 Organizations often are prohibited from spending
funds on behalf of a candidate in the primary, 122 are bound by primary election results, 123 and are required to report their expenditures
in the general election campaign.1 2 ' Aggregations of economic re1 25
sources are restricted as a result of the new campaign finance laws
and, in the
case of presidential elections, by exclusive public
126
funding.
This individualist view, however, makes the parties transparent-only their membership is visible. If the parties have a role to
play in altering or illuminating the political landscape, a focus on its
parts cannot suffice.
II.

THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS OF PARTIES

Coexisting uneasily with the individualist focus of Buckley and
its progenitors is a corporate focus that has crept into some of the
ballot access cases. In Storer v. Brown, 27 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of avoiding "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism [that might] do significant damage to the
fabric of government."' 2 Healthy parties and healthy factions are
not necessarily contradictions as the Court implied. 29 Yet, the Court
in Storer appears to have been reiterating the classic support for a
party system and the unity that parties can foster.
A corporate approach also surfaced in the delegate apportionment cases. In deciding the challenges to the way that delegates
were allocated to the national party conventions, the appellate courts
in Ripon Society v. National Republican Party30 and Seergy v.
Kings County Republican County Committee'' concluded that parties had a first amendment right to pursue two competing goals: to
121.

No requirement other than a filing fee and declaration of intention is required in

DEL, CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3103, 3106 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 204B.03, .06 (West
Supp. 1982); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.08, .12 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); W. VA. CODE

§§ 3-5-7, -8 (1979).
122.
123.
124.
1978).
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See, e.g., N.Y. ELEc. LAW § 2-126 (McKinney 1978).
See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-110 (McKinney 1978).
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. IV 1980); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-102 (McKinney
2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976).
26 U.S.C. §§ 9003, 9033 (1976).
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
Id. at 736.
See Infra text accompanying notes 252-54, 272, 300.
525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972).
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win, which includes building, organizing, reflecting, encouraging,
and rewarding party sentiment and to exercise ideological choice,
which affects chances for success and reflects the parties' raison
d'etre. Identification of the legitimate objectives of political parties
was crucial to these appellate courts in deciding whether to let the
parties alone in structuring representation at their national conventions, and to the Supreme Court in deciding how the ballot might be
restricted.
Where, however, do the policies of unity, promotion, and choice
that the courts identified come from? If from the first amendment,
how? If they are supported by constitutional history and the views of
the Framers, then Storer, Ripon, and Seergy do not make that clear.
In search of justification for those policies we return to the clauses of
the first amendment: speech, assembly, and petition. These are, in
part, atomistic rights-everyone has them. There are three major
justifications: first, because government cannot be allowed to select
speakers, nominees, or election victors;13 2 second, because subjection
to democratic decisionmaking without participation in the process is
unjust;1 33 and third, because of the inability to predict the course
and validity of ideas-from anyone's mouth may come important
truths.13 4 Yet these are also corporate rights dominated by the rights
to assemble, associate, and elect by majority vote. Looking at political organizations from a functional perspective yields a very different
version of their rights and duties and a basis for evaluating the specific claims of the political organizations we call parties. The question, then, is what purpose do political organizations fulfill? For reasons that will be explored, both the competition for victory and the
effort to state an ideological position are central to the functions of
political organizations.
The sections that follow elaborate on party functions, basing the
discussion on a structural analysis of the expression that is protected
by the first amendment. The discussion also relates the descriptions
of party functions employed by political scientists to those requirements of the first amendment.
132. See Blasi, supra note 2, at 611-31; Gottlieb, Government Allocation of First
Amendment Resources, 41 U. Prrr. L. REv. 205, 249 (1980).
133. See Wellington, On Freedom of Expression 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1116-17 (1979).
134. See Canby, Programming in Response to the Community: The Broadcast Consumer and the First Amendment, 55 TEx. L. REv. 67 (1976); Wellington, supra note 133, at
1133-36.
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Privacy and the Creative Functions

The extent to which parties have a right to private decisionmaking is crucial in all areas: delegate selection, ballot structure, and
primary laws-each of which requires a definition of party membership-and disclosure laws that reveal financial support. In addition,
primary laws preclude private forms of party decisionmaking, such
as selecting a nominee by a delegate convention.
The issue of privacy has been burdened with the most deepseated ambivalence. It has been obvious to commentators that it is
necessary for people to join together at some stage to advance their
political goals, and that to do so effectively, they must be able to
exclude others. This necessity for exclusion served as the basis for
one commentator's criticism of the Democratic Party's rules for its
1972 convention:
The rules require notice and an opportunity for party members to
participate in all slate-making meetings in view of the fact that the
stages at which choices are drastically narrowed are at least as important as the stage at which a final selection is made. Yet if
groups of like mind on any party question other than the identity of
a presidential candidate are to be able to organize themselves and
thus bring their views to the point of serious debate within the
party, they must be able to exclude from their deliberations spoilers
of unlike mind.13 5
It is certainly valid, as well as essential, that all points of view be
taken into account. Ultimately, the greatest wisdom celebrated in
this culture is to listen to all sides of any issue. Thus, while allowing
people to sneak off by themselves may be justified, it also seems
small-minded and insidious. In short, privacy for decisionmaking
bodies is not a highly respected quality. This prevailing view has
been reflected in the very rules of the Democratic Party. 13 This
same ambivalence toward party privacy has been true of the courts.
135. Vining, Delegate Selection Reform and the Extension of Law into Politics,60 VA.
L. REV. 1389, 1396 (1974) (footnotes omitted). Slate-making refers to the selection of groups
of candidates for delegates who will run together on behalf of a specified candidate. For the
binding guidelines, see Mandatefor Reform: A Report of the Commission on PartyStructure
and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, Part II, C-4, reprintedin 117
CONG. REc. 32,908, 32,917 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mandatefor Reform].
136. See J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 8; Mandatefor Reform, supra note 135. See
also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 69-74 (1976) (reflecting prejudice against secrecy in parties). On the drive toward open meeting laws, see, for example, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2805 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 10004 (1979); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW
§ 98 (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982).
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They have protected parties from crossovers, 37 but not from state
definition of membership; 138 protected associations against disclosure, 139 but not in the context of political contributions. 4 0
Because of the equivocation that exists in this area, it is necessary to probe the underpinnings of associational privacy. This might
be done through an historical or a functional analysis. The participants in the adoption of the first amendment left evidence of support
for association as a tool of democracy, but left no definition of what
that entailed. Historical analysis leaves us, therefore, with the task
of discerning functionally how best to realize that general goal.
Underlying the need for privacy are creative and promotive
functions of political associations. These functions can be understood
both psychologically and logistically. Psychologically, it is difficult
for people to develop their own ideas in the context of immediate
criticism and argument from others; the pressure is too strong. Jury
studies confirm the general findings of research in group dynamics,
which reflect the power of majority opinion, although not its invariable correctness.141 In a not-insignificant number of cases, under the
special condition of the unanimity required, the minority convinces.
As that minority decreases in size, however, its ability to maintain its
confidence and adhere to its position declines markedly. Mutual support is important even for juries, who have been specially chosen and
prepared by the trial process. For other groups with less access to
accurate, relevant, and reliable information, with nothing comparable to voir dire to contain prejudice, the opportunity for private con142
sultation is irreplaceable. Premature exposure may be deadly.
The logistical point is equally compelling. The caliber and reliability of majority decisionmaking is affected by the resources availa137. See Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107, 120-26 (1981).
138. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752
(1973). See also cases cited supra note 54.
139. See Hynes v. Mayor & Council of the Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
140. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 69-74 (1976).
141. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315 n.12 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting); H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEisEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 490 (1966), quoted in Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 389 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH.
L. REv. 643, 673-79 (1975); Zeisel,. . . And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the
Federal Jury. 38 U. CI. L. REv. 710 (1971).
142. On the related topic of the "spiral of silence" in the political process, seeDavison,
Book Review, 44 PUB. OPINION Q. 605 (1980).
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ble to the group. For resources to be available they must first be
developed and organized. Presentations without planning are likely
to be mere babble, useless to all sides. This, in effect, requires that
people of like mind be able to communicate to develop the case they
intend to present. This point should be obvious from the experience
of lawyers who devote their time and team effort to develop trial and
negotiation strategy, but it is lost often in the haze of democratic
theory. Unless initial prejudices are to be allowed to rule decisions,
privacy must be maintained to develop plans to promote an idea. It
is a tenet of systems analysis that to optimize an entire system it is
often necessary to suboptimize the subsystems.14 a In precisely the
same sense, to optimize the quality of decisionmaking in a democracy, it is necessary to preserve undemocratic elements in the process. The sharing of contrary ideas, however worthy an ideal, is a
very inefficient process when the goal is to build and test a particular
hypothesis. In fact, contrary ideas appear only as noise and act as
barriers. They are not useful or fruitful at this preliminary stage in
decisionmaking. Thus the functionality of privacy varies with the degree of finality of the decisionmaking process.
These considerations require that party regulation incorporate
thinking space and planning/promoting space-that they sanctify
meaningful territory for the privacy of association. At some level, the
law must recognize the right to exclude.
At the level of organizations less inclusive than the two national
parties, considerations of privacy for refinement of ideas are plainly
appropriate.1 44 It does not necessarily follow that the law must recognize such a right at state or national party levels, or at the party
level at all. Parties, it could be argued, are not the places where
ideas are developed and need such care; the substance of many platform planks is no doubt conceived elsewhere. The policies of privacy
seem to have a much murkier relationship to those political gargantua we call parties, where the activity is more in the nature of compromise and dilution, rather than creation of ideas. Even ideas about
how to reconcile different interests and needs, however, require considerable creativity. Some ideas can only be developed at a party
level. Moreover, the difficulty of line-drawing between entities suggests that the large associations be treated in the same manner as
143.

G.

BLACK, THE APPLICATION OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS TO GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

116 (1968).
144. But see 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (Supp. IV 1980) (subjecting both small and large political commjttees to the reporting and disclosure provisions).
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the small ones. Thus, the opportunity for private decisionmaking
meetings remains significant at the party level.
B. Aggregation
A number of cases involving access to a place on the printed
ballot 145 focus on the need to bring the ballot down to a manageable

size. The courts treat it as a compelling interest. Both conventions
and primaries would satisfy that objective; but they would do so
differently.
To understand the problem of making elections manageable, it
is necessary first to explore constitutional history. The relevant history here is in the context of article II rather than the first amendment. As a rationale for the electoral college, this history does not
present a specific intent which is binding in the context of the first
amendment. Nevertheless the functions outlined by the founding
generation in the context of presidential selection are central to the
debate which must be carried out under the auspices of the first
amendment.
Professor Ceaser 14 6 suggests that the founding generation had
five objectives when they instituted the electoral college as the process for selecting the president. The first was the control of ambition.
The members of the Convention feared demagogues who would tout
their own virtues. Knowing the limitations of public debate they
sought to supplement it with a well-refined selection process. Second,
they hoped to promote leadership. An election in the House of Representatives or the selection of a president who did not have the support of a majority would substantially weaken the capacity of the
holder of the office. Third, they sought the selection of a man of
ability. They expected the electoral college to select what they called
"continental characters" of which the nation had an ample supply at
the close of the Revolution. They were overconfident in expecting,
however, that the supply of such preeminent men would continue
through other periods of history, and thus avoid the selection of relatively unpopular or little known presidents. Fourth, they sought to
secure the legitimacy of succession to the presidency. And, finally,
they sought a process which would facilitate choice and change of
national policy. Again, they were overconfident that a popular will
could be expressed in the selection of men on the basis of reputation
145.

See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).

146. J. CEASER, supra note 7, at 83-87.
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without an election contest. 4 The Constitution envisioned that those
five functions would be performed for presidential elections by electors selected in reasonably small geographic areas" ' so that they
would be known to the people and could, in turn, make an appropriate selection for the presidency.
Assembling the support of a majority is crucial to providing the
leadership, legitimacy, and public choice the founding generation
sought. '49 This is more difficult where the electorate is presented
with a choice among candidates who represent only a minority of the
electorate, or even more extreme, who are chosen by pluralities
among such minorities. Thus one crucial function related to the election is to provide a way for various groups and candidates to coalesce
and to compromise or bargain among themselves until choices
emerge that more broadly reflect the electorate at large. Moreover,
the difficulty of debating all issues which public officers might have
to consider in the context of an election campaign requires some
method
to "refine and enlarge the public views," as Madison put
it. 150
The draftsmen of the Constitution in fact considered the type of
electoral system modern legislation creates and they rejected it. They
did not want a system based on individual candidate appeals to the
public. Reputations should be "continental" to avoid factional or geographic candidates. They sought a way of aggregating preferences
rather than dividing the nation. Yet without strong parties, starting
a campaign must be based on joining many diverse organizations,
such as single-issue or nonpartisan civic groups, as well as on webs of
personal contacts. Without a unified organization among the different groups, the process of sharing and passing information becomes
quite unreliable, and undermines clear communication to the general
public. A great deal is left to the media plus "coffees" and handshakes. This results in overload-the public alone cannot handle the
147. Note that these goals are partly encompassed in the descriptive categories used by
political scientists to articulate the methods in which parties function. See J. KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 7, at 5.
148.

U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 1, cls. 1, 2, 3.

149. The Constitution required that in an election where a single candidate does not win
the support of a majority of electors, the House of Representatives selects the president. U.S.
CONsT. art. II, § 1,cl. 3. This procedure was instituted, at the risk of compromising the independence of the executive, to prevent the election of a minority president. See J. CEASER,
supra note 7, at 64-65.
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also L.
HAND, supra note 13, at 90-102 (1952).
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whole political job. Similarly, long ballots and extensive primaries
present more for resolution than the public, unaided, can handle, and
provide no remedy for the fragmentation of perspectives presented to
the public. 151 Thus, disaggregation of the public complicates the performance of the other functions identified above-selection of dedicated and able leaders.
The parties' contribution to the aggregation of public views
might be trivial for first amendment purposes if their roles were as
fungible as the Court believes contributions to be. 152 But if parties
perform a distinctive aggregative function, then the sacrifice of first
amendment values may be much more significant.
Jefferson perceived both the risk that a nonpartisan system
would favor the wealthy and notorious and the need for parties to
incorporate the interests of others.1 53 Van Buren drove this point
home several years later in urging a two-party system. 5 He recognized that the public's electoral task was too complex without parties, and saw that the advantage which the nonpartisan or one-party
system provided to the old Federalists was a direct result of this
overload. Shortly before his death, he posed the question of why the
caucus system had been so much more important to the success of
the Democrats than of the Federalists and provided this strikingly
modern answer:
Constructed principally of a network of special interests,-almost
all of them looking to Government for encouragement of some
sort,-the feelings and opinions of its members spontaneously point
in the same direction, and when those interests are thought in danger, or new inducements are held out for their advancement, notice
of the apprehended assault or promised encouragement is circulated through their ranks1 with
a facility always supplied by the
55
sharpened wit of cupidity.
Jefferson and Van Buren realized that the parties give a voice to
those parts of the population which would be poorly represented in a
nonpartisan or one-party system by aggregating the needs, views,
and perspectives of those who would otherwise be isolated or
151.
152.
153.
154.

See F. DALUNGER, supra note 21, at 148-49 (urging short ballots).
See supra text accompanying notes 88-89.
See J. CEASER, supra note 7, at 106-07.
See id. at 126, 131-32.

155.

MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL PAR-

TIES IN THE UNITED STATES

6, 226 (1867).
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unrepresented.1 5
Van Buren had the vision to see that the survival of opposing
parties was essential to his democratic purposes. A single party
would degenerate into an aristocratic, nonpartisan system. To this,
Van Buren added a concern for controlling the ambition of public
men. 151 Political associations can address those concerns by conducting a more searching examination of a candidate's record than
the public is capable of doing, and by giving a more organized presentation of the issues than the candidates could give individually. It
is true that such organizations suffer from myopias of their
own-preferring traditional formulas over new ideas. The major parties have adapted well to, but seldom kindled, political changes. Indeed, keeping contests within mainstream traditions has been their
strength. Conversely, the strength of third parties has been the reasonably well-orchestrated challenge of new ideas. For major and minor parties alike, however, there are economies of scale in combined
presentations driving home consistent approaches.
Thus, parties aggregate the needs of their members in two different ways: They permit the give and take necessary for the emergence of a common approach, and they support a more effective
presentation of that common view.
That parties can do those jobs does not establish that the first
amendment guarantees them that right. And that the Convention
had several functions in mind for the electoral college to which the
parties have fallen heir1 58 does not establish that they retain a constitutional right to exercise those functions. There may be ways to aggregate the diverse needs of the public without the mediation of political associations. But there is no good way to discuss such issues
without a right to associate. Primary laws provide a counting mechanism, but also create a discussion format in which candidates present
the issues individually. Analytically, the distinction between the
156. The ability of parties to give voice to working-class Americans has made reform
partly a matter of class as well as a matter of honesty. Thus, even Tammany Hall, which
became a symbol of machine politics at its worst, was formed to destroy what were considered
aristocratic Hamiltonian notions which seemed to threaten genuine democracy. See E. CosTIKYAN, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 22 (1966). See also Schumach, Book Finds "Boss" Tweed a
Much Maligned Character,N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
157. See J. CEASER, supra note 7, at 135-36.
158. The transition of power to the parties was the result of the manipulations of Hamilton and Madison. See Cunningham, supra note 22, at 241; J. CHARLES, supra note 22, at 84.
Several later presidents, notably Jefferson and Van Buren, gave the party system its permanent shape and its ideological underpinnings. J. CEASER, supra note 7, at 88-169.
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counting mechanism and the discussion format is important. 1 9 In
devising nomination and counting mechanisms we are under no injunction from the Constitution except those surrounding the right to
vote. The objectives that the founders incorporated into their plan, as
outlined by Ceaser, may be persuasive but they have not bound us.
In our handling of political discussion and association, however, they
did bind us in 1791.160 The people have the constitutional right to
express their views on political questions, including the competence
and appropriateness of candidates, and association is necessary to
that end. Associations, in turn, affect substantially the mix of views
of the public. Government has no right to alter or deflect that mix in
the teeth of the first amendment."61
C. Choice Among Candidates and Control of Incentives
In addition to informing public discussion, the parties also have
served the public as objects of reliance. The conventions are crucial
to the issue of public reliance. Without conventions people may rely
on a party label or selection at a primary, but not on the benefits
gained from a decisionmaking body that meets, discusses, and hammers out a common plan. Cousins v. Wigoda,162 showing some respect for the convention, and Buckley v. Valeo,163 presiding over the
diminution of the party's role in the campaign through a complex set
of financial provisions, reflect the Supreme Court's ambivalence with
respect to the party's role as an organized entity in which the people
may place their trust. Again, to satisfy the purposes of the first
amendment, it is necessary to explore both history and function.
The constitutional draftsmen went to considerable lengths to
control the behavior and incentives of lawmakers. Although it is rea159. This distinction parallels the distinction in Democratic Party of the United States
v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981), between the right of the state to provide
procedure and its right to enforce that procedure on the party when it conflicts with party
rules.
160. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41-51
(1969), who argues that freedom of speech on national issues is protected against state infringement as a logical derivative of our federal form of government and, therefore, is logically
and philosophically antecedent to the first amendment. This reasoning can be extended to associational rights as well, as a derivative of democratic government, and an argument can be
made that the Constitution's provisions on elections are designed to protect these rights.
161. I have argued elsewhere that government has the duty to choose only those means
of involvement in the electoral process which proportionally reflect the various ideological perspectives current among the electorate. Gottlieb, supra note 132, at 224-25.
162. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
163. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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sonable to suppose that the prospect of being defeated in office will
create a substantial incentive for public officers to conform their behavior to the best interests of the public, or at least to what the public perceives to be its best interests, the draftsmen of the Constitution went considerably further. Treating the electorate as an
unwieldly mechanism, they wrote a number of prohibitions into the
main body of the document even before the debate over the addition
of the Bill of Rights. 1 4 They expected some restraint because the
legislators themselves would have to endure the full effect of the legislation they passed.18 5 And they plainly expected checks and balances to come not only from the structure of the Constitution they
were creating but from the federal system on which it was
superimposed.
Similarly, they did not assume that democratic elections would
automatically result in the selection of the most qualified personnel.
They arranged to have senators selected by state legislatures.' As
discussed above, 67 they expected the electoral college to control ambition, promote leadership, and select men of ability. By such devices, the Constitution's architects designed a mandate to "refine and
enlarge" the public views.168 They recognized that some means of
focusing the energies and incentives of candidates on the long-run
needs of the country are quite necessary.
Political parties ultimately came to play a part both in choosing
and controlling leaders. It seems unlikely that the founders envisioned parties as agents, relied upon by the public to choose, rather
than as speakers who were welcome only to argue. As the parties
developed, however, voters in large numbers came to rely on the parties' choices. 6 9 In general elections few exercise independent judgment beyond the most highly publicized races. The further one
moves down the ballot, the more difficult it is for voters to make
selections without reliance on the party label. One can argue that the
parties should be further excluded from the ballot and a role in selection. But it is hard to envision politics without someone playing
that role-without parties, one can expect that someone else will
164. See, e.g., U.S. CoNsTr. art. I, § 9; I. BRANT, supra note 27, at 11-22.
165.

THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 352-53 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

166. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
167.
168.

See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
THE FEDERAUST No. 10, at 81-82 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

169.

See generally P. DAVID, PARTY STRENGTH IN THE UNITED STATES 1872-1970, at

302-03 (1972); N. NIB, S. VERBA & J. PETRocIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN VOTER 47-55

(1976).
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perform that job.
The same caveat that held for aggregative functions"' applies
here: The functions of control of incentives and selection of able
leaders may be performed in some way other than through parties,
but the discussion which is essential to them cannot be denied to
political association. That may include discussion of whether there is
an agent in the body politic which is capable of assisting in those
functions and in whom the public's confidence can justly be placed.
Moreover discussion of choice and direction cannot, in harmony with
freedom of expression, be regulated in ways which do not accurately
reflect the strengths of various ideological perspectives current
among the electorate.1 71 As long as the people's ability to choose is
respected, however, and as long as people are permitted to associate
and organize themselves as they find best facilitates the political expression of their concerns, it is not constitutionally necessary to give
the parties a formal place in the proceedings. It may turn out that
the parties in fact are effective and appropriate mechanisms for the
formal election process. That is partly a prudential issue to be informed by our understanding of their effects, and partly a constitutional issue governed by the right to vote 72 and is not an issue to be
controlled by our understanding of the first amendment. It should be
clear, however, that the rights of public discussion and association
and the objectives of a responsible selection system may support
rather than conflict with each other.
D. Delegation
Functions like controlling the incentives of public officers can
only be acceptable if the political organization is structured as a
delegate assembly, that is, that the public willingly delegates decisionmaking authority to it. Without a grant of public confidence, interposition of the party between the electorate and the government
can only be seen as illegitimate.
In this respect, political parties are fundamentally different
from other nongovernmental institutions which specialize in expres170. See supra text accompanying notes 158-61.

171. While reasonable territorial, as opposed to proportional, schemes are certainly acceptable, perhaps preferable for general elections, the requirement of a decent reflection of
public sentiment, see supra note 161, does limit the range of appropriate systems in the sphere

of discussion. For descriptions of the range of territorial and proportional formulas, see D.
RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL LAWS (rev. ed. 1971).

172.

See generally infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
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sion and persuasion and therefore require the protections of the first
amendment. Pressure groups are by definition minority organizations. Media are not majoritarian-although mass media appeal to
large numbers, they necessarily explore issues before the public can
reach conclusions. The smaller journals and periodicals deliberately
explore specialized audiences. To hold them responsible for pleasing
the electorate would be to reduce their freedom. Parties are different; we do hold them responsible. We may need to hold them
responsible.
The ability and propriety of the parties functioning as delegates
of the public depends, in turn, on the reasonableness of the opportunity of the public to shift its allegiance from old to new parties, 7 3 or
on the ability of the public to control the party itself. The latter has
significant consequences. State courts have intervened vigorously in
pursuit of public control of parties, finding the function of internal
democracy most congenial.' 7 Although primaries and proportional
representation for convention delegates may promote maximum
membership representation, federal courts have shown sensitivity to
the existence of competing values, identified in the cases as ideological and tactical goals, but both paralleling the functions identified
above. 17 5 As the Court recognized in Cousins v. Wigoda,17 6 the

party's composition and its public stance may be inseparable and the
party may have to define one in order to define the other.
These functions of the political parties are required for the benefit of the general public in order that it may select more wisely at
the general election. That public requires both the parties' pursuit of
victory and pursuit of ideological purity. It requires that the party
create, refine, and promote ideas as well as aggregate the different
perspectives of large segments of the population, monitor the activities of public office holders, and represent the public to achieve what
the public finds difficult to accomplish directly. This view of the
functions of the political parties is in some ways analogous to the
idea that free speech rests on the public's right to know 17 7 -parties

exist and have rights because the people need them. It does not fol173. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96-98
(1976); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730-32 (1974).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 51-63. This approach invites major conflicts
between the parties' requirements for privacy and their delegate functions.
175. See supra notes 76-80, 130-31 and accompanying text.
176. 419 U.S. at 489-90.
177. See generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WAsH.

U.L.Q. 1.
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low, however, from the realization that the public's needs justify
freedom that the public's needs can be turned into a principle of
regulation. Just as the public's right to know would be compromised
by any system which allowed the public to censor information in advance, so is the public's need for assistance in the election process
compromised by insisting on majoritarianism at every stage in the
process.
The sections that follow explore major areas of regulation of
political parties, and consider the relationship of the functions we
have identified to the regulation undertaken.
III.

CORRUPTION

The Court in Buckley v. Valeo17 8 relied on a rationale of
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. 1 9 This rationale may properly be based on the right to vote. The Constitution
nowhere mentions a general right to vote. It provides a specific right
to vote for senators,1 80 it assumes suffrage in providing for states to
determine the manner of elections,1 81 and it requires equality.18 2 Presumably the guarantee of republican government 8 3 guarantees some
right to vote for state office. However created, the right to vote has
long been treated as inherent in democratic government,"" and the
Court concluded a century ago that the government has an inherent
right to protect it.1 85
Corruption disturbs the equality of the vote and infringes on the
effectiveness of the ballot. While the basic political struggle is ideological and the public stands to gain or lose based upon policies
which affect the electorate generally, the possibility of special advan178.
179.

424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 25.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
181. Id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 1, § 4, c1. 1.
182. Id. at amends. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. The language of the ninth amendment is easily broad enough to encompass a similar requirement.
183. Id. at art. IV, § 4.
184. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, §§ 1, 2; XV, § 1. See also the Reconstruction
Debates at CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2880-83 (1866) (statement of Rep. Ashley);
id. at 2462-64 (statement of Rep. Garfield); id. app. at 56-58 (statement of Rep. Julian); id. at
405-06 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 204-05 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1966) (statement of Benjamin Franklin); G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 22-25 (1969). On the history of the
right to vote provisions, see J. ELY, supra note 24, at 118-20; J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1956).
185. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:191

tages for individuals or groups is always present. These advantages
undermine popular control of the political process, and cheapen democratic government. This problem has led the courts to accept restrictions on political parties. The Supreme Court took a rather extreme position when it offered to justify legislation on the basis of
the "appearance of corruption," 186 but the reality of corruption is
bad enough. To come to grips with this rationale for regulation, we
must spend some time probing the disease.
There are considerable opportunities for individual advantages
in politics which compete with the advantages available from public
spirit.1 87 The potential of bribery, intimidation, patronage, or other
individualistic favors promises substantial individual rewards. The
overall group impact is plainly less significant to many of the people
who have such personal opportunities; and those larger interests, if
they are considered, are discounted by the difficulty of making much
of a difference.1 88 It is to the public's advantage to become well
aware of these side deals and to try to prevent them to obtain a truer
reflection among lawmakers of the public's policy choices and presumably overall social benefits which far exceed relatively trivial insider's profits. Without incurring public wrath, however, it is to the
advantage of candidates and organizations to make whatever deals
will strengthen their own political chances. The existence of political
parties magnifies the impact of this kind of politics because it simplifies passing on an inheritance. Personal political organizations are
often limited by the cult of their leader, whereas institutionalized
structures can continue indefinitely.
Corruption, however, cannot be given unlimited weight. One
must weigh the added benefits against the costs of eliminating the
last vestige of corruption.18 9 As in the Red scare cases,1 90 it is destructive and improper to weigh a feared evil in its entirety against
only specific injuries to free speech.""' Those simply are not compa186. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 27 (1976).
187. The nature of the temptation for corruption is perhaps best illustrated in game
theory by the mixed strategy games, in which substantial general benefits from cooperation
conflict with even larger individual payoffs from antisocial behavior. See T. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 213-14 (1960).
188. Contrast this with the founders' hope that legislators would have a community of
interests with their constituents. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 165.
189. See Banfield, Corruption as a Featureof Governmental Organization, 18 J. L. &
ECON. 587, 588-91 (1975).
190. E.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
191. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262-68 (1967).
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rable weights in the scales. It adds insult to injury to focus on the
appearanceof corruption 19 2 -are we to be governed by rumor, mob
psychology and common errors? Surely the first amendment must be
worth more than that.
The crucial problem is that a number of approaches to the
problems of corruption and personal influence have been tried without success. This failure is crucial because under any theory of the
first amendment, the problems of unrestrained partisan organization
can undermine democratic governments. Perhaps, as we will explore
in the next section, the most effective method was the original one.
IV.

ELECTION LAWS AND THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF
POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

Before turning to conventions and to the primary laws which
largely eliminated them, the succeeding sections will develop the major historic alternatives. The objective in these preliminary sections is
to lay a groundwork for considering both persisting problems of corruption which have led courts to accept limitations on the right of
association, and less restrictive means of eliminating them against
which primary election laws must be measured.
A.

The First Hundred Years-The Checks-and-Balances
Approach

The convention delegates in 1787 were well aware of the ways
in which partisanship could undermine democracy 193 and they
adopted a strategy-the creation of competing sources of power.
They enshrined the theory of checks and balances and the division
and separation of powers in the Constitution itself. Political machines, when they have been destroyed, have often been bested either
by factional splits that allowed some insurgent group to weaken the
party at its center or by attacks from outside organizations uncontrolled by the machine. Reformers have included state attorneys general, U.S. Attorneys and a bar association, as in the case of the
Tweed ring. 9 Sometimes the challenge has been leveled by a third
party such as the fusion parties in New York City. 19 5 Assaults have
192. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
193. See Shenker, Dirty Politics in 18th Century-Sainthoodin the 20th, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1978, at A18, col. 3.
194. See generally G. MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFUCTs 29-39, 66-73 (1970).
195. See R. CARO, THE POWER BROKER 70, 347-56 (1974); E. COSTIKYAN, supra note
156, at 14-21.
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come from forces in separate geographical constituencies in control,
for example, of the White House or the state house, which challenged local leaders in court or in legislature, or redirected patronage
to other organizations.1 96
As it turned out, political parties themselves became the major
check and balance. It would be more than a century before a twoparty system would be legally established. Until then, the vote was
accomplished by means of a box into which the voter put slips of
paper with names of candidates. In this system there was no issue of
qualifying for the ballot or of designating positions on the ballot. The
parties printed their own ballots and the voter could use that printed
ballot if he chose to do so. Third parties and major parties were legally on a par and could print and supply ballots without legal
restriction.
The organization of new parties played a major role in that first
century.1 97 Jefferson and Madison used that device to oust the Federalists in 1800. Martin Van Buren built a new party around Andrew Jackson. The issue of slavery was not defined for American
politics by the Democrats and the Whigs, which were the major preCivil War parties but were split down the middle by the issue."9 8
Instead, the Free Soilers and Republicans organized around this issue. 199 Post-Civil War parties were much more stable,2 ° but the
Populists had a major impact nonetheless. 01
The period was not without its problems. The public visibility of
the paper ballot, as voters carried it to and placed it in the ballot
box, invited both bribery and intimidation. Goon squads and varieties of political fraud became major scourges of American politics.
A still common, but strikingly racist, explanation of these problems
links the extent of immigration both to ballot box fraud and to the
rise of political machines.2 °2 As a result, the parties remain tarred by
the brush of nineteenth century ethnic politics. Evidence now shows
that ballot box fraud was as prevalent in the countryside as in the
cities despite marked differences in the period and heritage of their
196. See A. STEINBERG, supra note 14, at 8-9, 84-85.
197. See D. MAZMANIAN, TmnR PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 81-82, 87
(1974).
198. Id. at 36-38.
199. Id. at 36-38, 41.
200. Id. at 48-49.
201. Id. at 82-85. See generally M. STEDMAN & S. STEDMAN, DISCONTENT AT THE
POLLS 12-21 (1950).
202. See F. DALLINGER, supra note 21, at 96, 99; A. RANNEY, supra note 13, at 156-57.
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settlements.20 3 And machines like Tammany Hall dated back to the
election of 1800.204 Indeed, conservative Whigs charged tyranny
whenever an itinerant newspaper editor organized a town meeting.20 5
It is not at all easy to explain the different perceptions of the behavior of late nineteenth century parties, swelled by the great Eastern
and Southern European immigrations, from the perceptions of early
nineteenth century patronage, 20 6 except on a class or racial basis.
The dispersion of abuses in time, culture and geography weakens the
link between political corruption and immigrant politics.
The open ballot, the debilitating aftermath of the Civil War and
the boom-and-bust economy seem much more relevant in explaining
the history of nineteenth century political abuse. In that environment, what the parties accomplished is significant, rather than how
corrupt they became, as is the accuracy of the founders' faith in the
advantages of a free and open political system. Also significant for
our purposes is the fact that this checks-and-balances approach underscored, rather than subordinated, the political functions of the
parties. The problem of corruption, however, would soon spawn considerable legal regulation in which the parties' creative, aggregative
and selective functions would be subordinated to its delegate
function.
B. Regulation of Party Meetings
The first stage in the regulation of political parties involved the
conduct of party meetings.20 7 In some areas, nineteenth century parties supervised a balloting process among their members for delegates to caucuses or conventions. In others, open meetings of the parties' followers were held.208 Both systems were tarnished by physical
203. Converse, supra note 14, at 278-96. See also R. KORNGOLD, THADDEUS STEVENS
53-63 (1955) (describing ballot fraud and the takeover of the Pennsylvania legislature in
1838).
204. See E. ROSEBOOM, A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 41-42 (1957); A.
STEINBERG, supra note 14, at 3; Cunningham, supra note 22, at 250.

205. See Yeoman's Gazette (Concord, Mass.), Mar. 11, 1837 at 3, col. 2; id., Mar. 12,
1836 at 3, col. 1; 5 JOURNALS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 1820-1872, at 76 (E.W. Emerson
& W.E. Forbes, eds. 1910) (referring to the editor of the Democratic Concord Freeman as
"the dictator of our rural Jacobins").

206.

On the development of patronage practices, see L. WHITE, THE

STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY

347-64 (1951); L. WHITE, THE

IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 307-16 (1954).
207. See generally C. MERRIAM & L. OVERACKER,

JEFFERSONIANS:

JACKSONIANS:

A

A

STUDY

supra note 65, at 1-22 (discussing

early legislative regulation of party meetings).

208. See F. DALLINGER, supra note 21, at 53-56.
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violence and dishonest procedures. 0 9 The principal judicial headache
in this period was the holding of rival meetings, caucuses or conventions, and the presentation of multiple tickets per party at the general elections.210 In some cases, a group or club simply met and
claimed a place on the ballot. 1 Judicial intervention in matters of
2 12
such disharmony was not always successful.
Some rather basic questions of parliamentary procedures also
came under early judicial scrutiny,213 including the chairman's duty
to honor calls for a ballot,2 1 ' the physical strength of keepers of the
ballot box, 2 15 problems with lock-outs, 211 and problems of notice.217
Difficulties with ballots, 218 notice,2 19 quorums, 220 authority of party
209. Id. at 96-98, 121-26.
210. See, e.g., McDonald v. Hinton, 114 Cal. 484, 46 P. 870 (1896); People ex rel.
Eaton v. District Court, 18 Colo. 26, 31 P. 339 (1892); Sims v. Daniels, 57 Kan. 552, 46 P.
952 (1896); Shields v. Jacob, 88 Mich. 164, 50 N.W. 105 (1891); Manston v. McIntosh, 58
Minn. 525, 60 N.W. 672 (1894); State ex rel. O'Malley v. Lesueur, 103 Mo. 253, 15 S.W.
539 (1891); State ex rel. Pigott v. Benton, 13 Mont. 306, 34 P. 301 (1893); Phelps v. Piper, 48
Neb. 724, 67 N.W. 755 (1896); State ex rel. Sturdevant v. Allen, 43 Neb. 651, 62 N.W. 35
(1895); In re Redmond, 5 Misc. 369, 25 N.Y.S. 381 (Sup. Ct. 1893); State ex rel. Bloomfield
v. Weir, 5 Wash. 82, 31 P. 417 (1892); Marcum v. Ballot Comm'rs, 42 W. Va. 263, 26 S.E.
281 (1896).
211. E.g., Fields v. Osborne, 60 Conn. 544, 21 A. 1070 (1891); State ex rel. Russell v.
Tooker, 18 Mont. 540, 46 P. 530 (1896).
212. In re Pollard, 25 N.Y.S. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
213. See Beck v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 103 Mich. 192, 61 N.W. 346 (1894) (rejecting a challenge to a proxy and holding invalid an election by lot in case of a tie); Phillips v.
Gallagher, 73 Minn. 528, 76 N.W. 285 (1898) (allowing convention to proceed with second
ballot); Manston v. McIntosh, 58 Minn. 525, 60 N.W. 672 (1894) (allowing for "mass convention" with direct voting instead of delegate procedure). See generally McDonald v. Hinton,
114 Cal. 484, 487-90, 46 P. 870, 871-72 (1896) (Garoutte, J., dissenting) (describing the
problems courts confront when they attempt to resolve parliamentary issues).
214. In re Broat, 6 Misc. 445, 452-53, 27 N.Y.S. 176, 181 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
215. Id. at 454-55, 27 N.Y.S. at 182.
216. In re Woodworth, 16 N.Y.S. 147, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1891), appeal dismissed, 19
N.Y.S. 525 (Sup. Ct. 1892).
217. E.g., State ex rel. Russell v. Tooker, 18 Mont. 540, 46 P. 530 (1896); State ex rel.
Metcalf v. Johnson, 18 Mont. 548, 46 P. 533 (1896); In re Woodworth, 16 N.Y.S. at 151.
218. E.g., Baran v. Kelly, 119 N.J. Super. 567, 293 A.2d 189 (1972) (holding roll-call
vote is appropriate means of determining whether ballot for election should be open or secret);
In re Atlantic County Bd. of Elections, 117 N.J. Super. 244, 284 A.2d 368 (1971) (holding
failure to count absentee vote was improper); Bontempo v. Carey, 64 N.J. Super. 51, 165 A.2d
222 (1960) (invalidating "unit rule" and proxy voting); Atkins v. Monahan, 59 A.D.2d 793,
398 N.Y.S.2d 456 (3d Dep't 1977) (holding proxy voting invalid).
219. E.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Riddell v. National Democratic
Party, 344 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Miss. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 508 F.2d 770 (5th
Cir. 1975); Pirtle v. Dalmasso, 240 Ark. 1029, 403 S.W.2d 740 (1966); State ex rel. Robinson
v. King, 86 N.M. 231, 522 P.2d 83 (1974); Mandate for Reform, supra note 135, at 32,912,
32,917.
220. E.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. County Court, 154 W. Va. 558, 177 S.E.2d 349
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committees,22 1 and qualifications for membership,
persist to the
present day.223
While problems with party meetings, including conventions, set
the stage for judicial intervention in party governance, the courts'
analyses generally did not reach the constitutional issues.224 Their
approach is no longer tenable. In Cousins v. Wigoda,225 the Supreme
Court, employing a constitutional analysis, overrode state primary
laws on behalf of party rules.226 In Marchioro v. Chaney, the
Court implied that forms of party organization may not be prescribed by state legislation with regard to political issues, as opposed
(1970); State ex rel. Bell v. County Court, 141 W. Va. 685, 92 S.E.2d 449 (1956).
221. E.g., O'Brien v. Fuller, 93 N.H. 321, 39 A.2d 220 (1944); Wall v. Currie, 147 Tex.
127, 213 S.W.2d 816 (1948); King County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Republican State
Comm., 79 Wash. 2d 202, 484 P.2d 387 (1971); State ex rel. Goodwin v. County Court, 147
W. Va. 62, 125 S.E.2d 417 (1962).
222. E.g., Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107 (1981); Dorf v. Skolnik, 380 Md. 101, 371 A.2d 1094 (1977).
223. It is interesting to compare the treatment of these issues in the political context
with their treatment in the corporate and labor contexts. In the corporate context, statutes
define membership in voting entities, i.e., classes of stock, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151,
(1974); set the conditions of exclusion from the voting entity, e.g., id. § 213; regulate the
weight of each vote, e.g., id. § 212; regulate the form of ballot, e.g., id. § 211(e); regulate
coalitions among voters via proxies, e.g., id. § 212(c); specify the rules for contesting election
results, e.g., id. §§ 225-227; require meetings with adequate notice, e.g., id. §§ 211, 222; allow
for stockholder inspection of corporate documents, e.g., id. § 220; and require filing of registration statements for additional disclosure, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f, 77g, 77j, 77aa (1976).
The union context is similar. Membership is regulated by determination of the bargaining
unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1976). Equality of voting power for members of the voting units is
required. Id. § 411(a)(1). Meetings, notice, rules of exclusion, and rules about candidacy are
also covered. Id. § 481(e). Finally the labor laws include considerable regulation of disclosure
to union members of information relevant to the campaigns. Id. §§ 414, 431(c), 481(c).
It is not clear that these rules work well in either context. In the corporate world, contests
for power are kept to a minimum, partly by the impact of the rules; proxy fights are extremely
expensive, rarely undertaken and only occasionally successful. Surely not all of the disadvantages can be laid to these rules. The dispersion of voters and the apathy of the voting population have much to do with the problem. See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66-111, 244-52 (rev. ed. 1968); A. BERLE, JR., POWER
WITHOUT PROPERTY 105 (1959). However, regulation in the corporate area has some tremendous advantages. The body of electors is quite clearly defined, and their interests may be fairly
gleaned from the contractual conditions of their stock.
Similarly in the union context, challenges to leadership are rare, seldom successful, often
dangerous and certainly expensive. The changes in the laws requiring stricter disclosure may
be helping challengers somewhat. But the overall picture of union management is not that of
an informed electorate and vigorous democracy. See generally S. LiPSEr, M. TROW & J.
COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY

224.
225.
226.
227.

201-390 (1956).

See cases cited supra notes 39-40.
419 U.S. 477 (1975).
Id. at 490-91.
442 U.S. 191 (1979).
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to ministerial or administrative ones. 22 8 Although the Court left
room for compelling interests to outweigh the rights of political parties, it left uncertain what sort of regulation would satisfy the criterion by best purifying the political processes.
The constitutional problems posed by regulation of party meetings are rendered all the more intractable by the troublesome relationship between the remedies employed and the underlying goal of
controlling corruption. Rules about openness or secrecy of meetings
are problematic. Secrecy permits meetings to hide objectives and relationships. The Democratic Party rules that were the source of the
litigation in Cousins v. Wigoda,229 would have made that much more
difficult. Open meetings, however, are vulnerable to takeovers. 23 0 To
protect themselves against "swamping" by well-organized and not
necessarily representative newcomers, clubs need minimum participational rules which the courts have elsewhere limited. 31 To protect themselves against violence, clubs need privacy and a share of
power. 2322 Rules requiring notice for meetings are problematic for the
same reason. Notice rules are essential in well-functioning democratic groups, but may be counterproductive when the group is under
considerable stress-knowledge is power both in the hands of the
good guys and the bad guys. Whether that problem is avoided by
substituting direct nominating primaries for meetings will be considered in the succeeding section. It does not follow, however, from the
disruptive forces which beset associational meetings, that either
primaries or open meetings will be improvements over whatever
structure the associations choose.
Cousins offers a nice example of the competing functions served
by meetings and primaries, and the difficulty of improving the purity
or responsiveness of parties through either meetings or primaries.
Cousins ruled in favor of delegates who had been selected at meetings, rather than primaries. Cousins did not do this by elevating notice and open meetings above primaries. The decision was based, instead, on deference to the party's decisionmaking machinery and the
228. Id. at 197-99.
229. 419 U.S. at 479 n.l.
230. J.KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 8-9.
231. See Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305 (1977); Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
232. For a profitable comparison, note the experience of the grape strikers who were
victims of repeated violence. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1973, at 10, col. 4 (Chavez-starting a
fast to affirm non-violence); id., Aug. 17, 1973, at 19, col. 3 (Chavez picket shot to death); id.,
Aug. 9, 1973, at 34 (Editorial).
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party's right to define and promote its public position. 3 Facing the
party, in turn, was a choice among dramatically different systems of
nomination.
If it could be determined a prioriwhere the interests of a representative party lie, legal regulation to secure that objective would be
unobjectionable. The problem is that the parties and their publics
won't lie still. To determine where the interests of a representative
party lie, it is necessary to determine some facts and to choose between delegate and creative roles. The credentials committee hearing
officer's report in Cousins23 4 details slate-making by the regular
party committees essentially in private, which contravened the rules.
Moreover, the delegates ultimately selected in the primary did not
meet the requirements for demographic dispersion set by the national commission and ratified by the 1972 convention 235 -i.e., they
did not mirror the population of Chicago in their composition with
respect to race, age and sex. But unanswered by the report is the
question of representation-the party's delegate function. Why did
the Daley faction win the Illinois delegates in the primary? Was it
because the voters wanted Daley's men? If so, the new party rules
frustrated them. Was it because Daley exercised corrupt control over
the city of Chicago, squelching powerful potential opposition and
building an organization out of ill-gotten gains? There was some evidence of the continued existence and vitality of a patronage system
involving most of those who participated on party committees.238
And there was some evidence and discussion of electioneering activities on the day of the primary. Or were the people of Chicago merely
apathetic, allowing a machine to continue its rule? Then perhaps the
new rules were a savior.
Why, however, should the focus be specifically on the people of
Chicago? Why aren't the delegates from other parts of the country
entitled to declare that they want to define a Democratic Party free
of deals with Daley because that is a political decision the rest of the
country wants? Would clearer notice merely have allowed an entrenched organization to take advantage of its terms against unorganized opposition? Thus the rules questions were entangled with
the question of the party's ability to decide whether it wanted to
shape its agenda and policies with the Daley forces or without them.
233.
234.
235.
236.

419 U.S. at 489-91.
App. C to Petition for Certiorari, Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
419 U.S. at 479 n.1.
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353-73 (1976).
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Some mechanism for dealing with that question is critical in the performance of the creative and promotive functions of parties.
Such a decision by a membership organization, however, could
only be justified by a delegation from the membership pursuant to
fair democratic procedures. The delegate functions of political parties are poorly served if the membership cannot work its will. The
organizations that now conduct primary campaigns are not membership organizations. Perhaps party supporters are entitled to endorse a
nonmembership structure. They are certainly entitled, however, to
create a structure which is democratically accountable to them and
in doing so, to the protection of law to effectuate that purpose. That
in turn justifies requiring that parties adopt either a delegate or direct primary or an open meeting process that reasonably guarantees
accountability of the leadership to the members. It was that choice
which the Democratic Party tried to strengthen in the rules adopted
for the 1972 Convention but which has been 3undermined
by the sub2 7
sequent rigidification in state primary laws.
C.

Primaries

1. The Expressive Functions.-The major changes in the structure of political relationships date from about the turn of the century. On the one hand, with the change to unified printed ballots the
states largely eliminated third parties through ballot access requirements. On the other hand, through the primaries they largely dismantled the major parties.238 William Crotty 239 and others argue in
their favor that primaries encourage political participation by newly
mobilized groups. The primaries also have other consequences, however. We are used to thinking of the primaries, as a single integrated
system. Yet many changes of the laws have been involved in their
formation. Among those changes, public supervision of the balloting
process alone may have worked a significant improvement in the operation of political organization, particularly at the local level. 40
237. See Crotty, In Favor of the Status Quo, in PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 15, 16 (F.
Havelick ed. 1981).
238. V.0. KEY, JR., supra note 7, at 169-96 (1956). Contemporary opposition to direct
primaries focused on problems of cost, demagoguery, burdens on conscientious voters, minority
control, and resulting perceived problems of quality and accountability. For a compendium of
views for and against direct primaries shortly after the great wave of legislation, see Is the
Direct Primary System Sound?, 5 CONG. DIG. 265-80, 282-84 (1926); The Injury of the
Direct PrimarySystem, MANUFACTURERS RECORD, July 8, 1926, at 55-56.
239. Crotty, supra note 237, at 17-19.
240. See generally C. MERRIAM & L. OVERACKER, supra note 65, at 23-30. CompareJ.
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The primary laws, however, took a number of additional steps.
There are four aspects of the way the primaries have been
structured that affect party functions. Originally primaries were optional.2 41 Among the first accompaniments of the change to a
mandatory primary were regulations concerning the definition of
party officers 242 and the selection of convention delegates.24 3 These
were designed to give the membership some control over the party
machinery. To the extent that the party is a membership organization,
this is arguably in aid of the party rather than in derogation of
it.2 " Most importantly, it helped eliminate the enormous confusion
which resulted when competing party factions held conventions and
claimed the party label on the ballot.2
A second early aspect of legal regulation of parties was to define
party membership without regard to party bylaws or decisions. 6
The purpose of "the scheme is to permit the voters to construct the
organization from the bottom upwards, instead of permitting leaders
HARRIS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 15-17, 150-54, 315-22 (1934 &

photo. reprint 1966) (describing abuses before the bulk of election law reform) with Converse,
supra note 14 (calculating the impact of the changes in election law on voting patterns). Disputes among party factions pose special problems that are not always satisfactorily handled.
See State ex reL Ward v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 186 La. 949, 173 So. 726 (1937)
(entitling factions to participate in selection of poll watchers); Note, Election Administration
in New York City: Pruning the Political Thicket, 84 YALE L.J. 61 (1974).
241. See 1898 N.Y. Laws ch. 179, § 14, amended by 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 891, § 29
(current version at N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 2-106 (McKinney 1978)). See also Rouse v. Thompson,
228 111.522, 81 N.E. 1109 (1907); People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 164 N.Y.
335, 338-43, 58 N.E. 124, 124-26 (1900) (describing the sequence of primary laws in New
York).
242. 1898 N.Y. Laws ch. 179 § 9(1). This statute was a step in the trend toward a
general requirement of primaries. Although the laws of 1898 mandated that committeemen be
elected through primaries, election of delegates still took place at conventions, and primaries
remained optional for the nomination of candidates. See id. § 4(1), (2). Ultimately, this trend
resulted in mandatory primaries for candidate nomination as well. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-160
(McKinney 1978). See also People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 164 N.Y. 335,
441-43, 58 N.E. 124, 125-26 (1900) (requiring party officers to be elected at primaries).
243. 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 891, § 37.
244. The recent demand that the delegates be selected in close proximity to the primaries or conventions tends to place the party organization, whose officers are often selected by
the convention, in the hands of the candidates whose campaigns are in full swing, rather than
the reverse. See generally Mandate for Reform, supra note 135; but see DELEGATE SELECTION RULES FOR THE 1980 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION, Rules 2, 3, 10 and 17
(1978). This change, however, was initiated by party rules, and one cannot object, on associational freedom grounds, to their right to make that choice.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 210-23.
246. See 1882 N.Y. Laws ch. 154 amended 1898 N.Y. Laws ch. 179, § 3 (current
version at N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-300 (McKinney 1978)). See also C. MERRIAM & L. OVERACKER, supra note 65, at 30-32, 69-73, 109-10.
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17
to construct it from the top downwards. 24
The definition of those
entitled to vote in party primaries also may have helped to reduce
corruption by reducing the power of party leaders. This legal definition of membership, however, is a mixed blessing. For the party may
have an interest in defining qualifications for membership in order to
clarify its public stance, or indeed to give it a chance to formulate
one. Thus creative and promotive functions are compromised by
mandatory open membership. Counting mechanisms such as run-offs
and petition requirements could be instituted without reference to a
membership organization to achieve many of the objectives of primaries. The problem created by the definition rules is not that they create access to an election mechanism but that they are used to take
over specific political associations. These difficulties are justified in
part, however, by the parties' delegate role and mitigated, at least in
the case of the major parties, by the improbability that, left to their
own devices, they would impose any qualifications for membership
beyond the registration system.
A third major and somewhat later development in the primary
laws was the shift to the direct selection of the candidates and the
elimination of conventions.248 More is at stake than the values of

247. People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 164 N.Y. 335, 342, 58 N.E. 124,
126 (1900). For current treatment of membership regulation, compare Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51 (1973) (striking statute which required a twenty-three month affiliation with a party
to be entitled to vote in party primary as unconstitutionally abridging freedom of association)
with Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107
(1981) (striking statute permitting open primary in conflict with party rules defining membership) and Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding constitutionality of statute
which required enrollment in party at least eight months prior to presidential election and
eleven months prior to nonpresidential election). See also Note, supra note 240, at 70.
248. Nominations for statewide offices are now made by direct primaries in most states.
ALASKA STAT. § 15-25.010 (1976); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-301, -302 (Supp. 19821983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-105 (1976); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6610 (West 1977); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, § 3101A (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 100.061 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §
34-1004 (1980); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 12-2 (Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 34-703 (1981); IND.
CODE ANN. § 3-1-9-1,(West 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 43.3 (West 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-202 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 118.105 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-481 (West 1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 441 (Supp. 1981-1982);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 5-1 (1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, § 41 (West 1975);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 168.531 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204B.03 (West Supp.
1982); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-1-19 (Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.339 (Vernon 1980);
MoNT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-601 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-503.01 (1974); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 293.175 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:11 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
19:13-1 (West 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-1(b) (Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16.111-01,-02,-03,-04 (1981); Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.01 (Page Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 1-102 (West Supp. 1981-1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 254.056 (1981); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 2862 (Purdon 1963); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-13-202 (1979); TEX. ELEC. CODE
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avoiding factionalism articulated in Storer v. Brown,249 or victory, as
articulated in Ripon Society v. National Republican Party 50 and
Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Committee.""1 The issue
is the party's ability to define a common viewpoint. The result of the
direct primary nomination has been to diminish substantially the aggregative functions of parties. 52 Conventions permit blending and
compromising that primaries, even with run-offs, do not, because
they leave out the common second choice of mutually antagonistic
blocks of voters. This is particularly true of primaries in which several candidates compete. To deal with the divisive implications of
primaries, some states, like California and Wisconsin, have turned to
unofficial conventions. 253 But in others, primaries continue to divide
the parties.

It is plain that the primary system aggregates public views quite
ANN. art. 13.02 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2351 (Supp. 1981); W.
VA. CODE § 3-5-4 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.16 (West Supp. 1982-1983); Wyo. STAT.

§

22-5-101 (1977).
Some of these states continue to provide for the selection of delegates to conventions. Thus
the function of the convention is reduced to the adoption of party platforms or to the selection
of candidates for lesser office. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-102(d) (1976); CAL. ELEC. CODE §
9279 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3113 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 34-707
(1981); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-1-10-3 (West 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 43.111 (West Supp.
1982-1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-3810 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 202A.12 (West Supp.
1982); MIss. CODE ANN. § 23-1-3 (Supp. 1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.11 (Page
1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2319 (Supp. 1981); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.18 (West Supp.
1982-1983); Wyo. STAT. § 22-4-118 (1977).
Several states continue to allow nominating conventions. In some states, primaries are
optional. ALA. CODE § 17-16-5 (1977); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-11-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976); VA.
CODE § 24.1-172 (1980). One state provides for a convention if the primary fails to nominate
a candidate. S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 12-5-20 (1982). Others provide for conventions followed by primaries, at which other candidates may challenge the parties' choices. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 1-4-601 (1980) (all candidates with more than twenty percent of convention vote may
run in primary); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400 (West Supp. 1982) (all candidates with
more than twenty percent of convention vote may run in primary); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6104(2) (McKinney 1978) (all candidates with more than twenty-five percent of convention
vote may run in primary); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-4-9 (Supp. 1981) (two candidates receiving
highest number of convention votes may run in primary).
Illinois provides conventions for some offices, primaries for others. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46,
§9 7-1, -9 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983). New Mexico permits candidates to run in a primary with either a required percentage of convention delegates, or a required number of signatures on petitions. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-8-21, -22, -38, -39 (1978).
249. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
250.

525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).

251. 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972). See supra text accompanying notes 127-31.
252. See A. RANNEY, supra note 13, at 134-39.
253. F. CARNEY, supra note 17, at 12, 16; Sorauf, Extra-Legal PoliticalPartiesin Wisconsin, 48 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 692 (1954).
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imperfectly. It pyramids power on the shoulders of small minorities
of the electorate by encouraging candidates to take their case directly to the voters. Candidates closely allied in ideological position
thus split the electorate among them and leave the field to a candidate who may be truly acceptable to only a small percentage of the
voters.25
The job of identifying candidates most acceptable to a majority
of the parties' members could be performed via devices other than
conventions. Such alternatives might allow voters, for example, to
express preferences, second choices, etc. 2 55 This, however, would accomplish nothing more than what the parties have already done by
convention.
Disaggregation is a problem on another level as well. It is difficult to go into any primary articulating more than a few positions on
salient issues and it is difficult to compromise, aggregate, or otherwise take account of unarticulated issues or competing blocks of voters. Conventions allow considerably more diversity and provide a
forum for reconciling those differences.
In addition to bypassing the parties as the engine of aggregating
member preferences, the selection of candidates at primaries also undermines the creative and promotive functions of the parties because
they entirely bypass the members and officers whose commitment is
to a common and cooperative strategy.285 Unable to get together to
work out and express a common judgment about the association's
proper standard-bearer and strategy without creating a new organi254. See generally V.0. KEY, JR., supra note 7, at 133-68. The importance of conventions to party unity is underscored by New York's experience with its challenge primary, N.Y.
ELEC. LAW § 6-104(2) (McKinney 1978), which allows relatively unified third parties to avoid
the primary process and play an unusually vigorous part in state politics. See D. MAZMANiAN,
supra note 197, at 115-32.
255. See C. MERRIAM & L. OVERACKER, supra note 65, at 83-85. Several states have
tried preferential voting systems, id., but most of the systems dropped the low candidates,
which probably does not perform the coalition building function we have been discussing as
well as do systems which add votes at different ranks until a majority is satisfied. See Gottlieb,

supra note 132, at 246-47.
256.

See J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 5-8. Compare the founders' concern with

demagoguery, supra text accompanying notes 146-47, with William Guthrie's concern early
this century:
In my judgment, the primary system tends to promote the nomination of self-advertisers, demagogues and wire-pullers by irresponsible minorities, groups, factions, cabals or secret societies, generally composed of persons acting mostly in the dark and

dominated and controlled by leaders who cannot be held to any accountability, however much they may prostitute the political power they exercise.
Quoted in L. ABRAHAMS, NEW YORK ELECTION LAW WITH FORMS 161 (1950).
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zation to replace the one taken over by state law, the membership is
denied not only its power to nominate but its freedom to associate in
aid of speech: This interference with the expressive functions of parties might seem mitigated in such contests as those for statewide office in New York,2 57 which place the primary after a convention and
make entry into the primary dependent on significant support in the
convention, except for the fact that New York also prohibits party
expenditures in support of a candidate in the primary.2 58 This prohibition of expression is the fourth aspect of primaries that infringes
on associational freedom.2 59 Prior to a nominating convention, the
use of party resources to support any faction in its bid for delegates
is inconsistent with a democratically run organization. After, or in
the absence of a nominating convention, however, prohibiting the use
of party resources effectively silences the party.
Buckley v. Valeo 26 0 struck expenditure limits in another context, finding that they struck too deeply at the ability of various
groups to participate in the campaign process. Here the primary
laws act to cut off entirely the expression of a point of view. Under
any theory of the first amendment this is the most precious speech
-political speech focused on who should and who should not hold
office.261 Moreover, these efforts to suppress it are neutral neither
among incumbents and their challengers, nor among various competing factions.26 2 The incumbents often reap the advantage of a disor257.

N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-104(1), (2) (McKinney 1978).

258. Id. at § 2-126. Similar provisions, limiting party support for its candidate, have
been adopted in other states. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 11702 (West 1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. §

11-205 (Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.230(1) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1982); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1395(2) (Supp. 1982-1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-216(2)
(1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:34-52 (West 1964); N. MEX. STAT. ANN. § 1-19-1 (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163-278.13(a) (Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. § 22-25-104 (1977). Michigan prohib-

its substantial contributions by political parties to candidates in all elections, including primaries. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.252(5) (Supp. 1982-1983). Some courts have allowed
party participation by restrictive interpretation of the statutes. E.g., Rosenberg v. Republican
Party, 270 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1954). One court has indicated that a ban on party endorsement
may be unconstitutional. State ex rel. Wells v. Dykeman, 70 Wash. 599, 127 P. 218 (1912).
Connecticut and Rhode Island specifically authorize a preprimary endorsement. CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 9-382 (West 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-12-4, -11 (1981). However, note that
regardless of statutory provisions, parties have historically allowed or required nominees for
some offices to fight their own election battles. See G. JACOnSON, supra note 7, at 35-36.
259. For other types of limitations dealing with political advertising, see AMERICAN
LAW DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND

56-73 (1976).
424 U.S. at 39-59.
See generally Blasi, supra note 2.
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-1 to -20 (1978)

STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW QUICK-REFERENCE CHARTS

260.
261.
262.
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ganized opposition. Competing groups are treated unequally, insofar
as parties which pursue a broad spectrum of political concerns are
subordinated to special purpose groups and individual candidates
seeking good avenues to publicity.2 a Moreover, the lack of a party
format means that there are few economies of scale in the presentation of public issues. Candidates develop positions individually, with
relatively restricted resources, and with little responsibility for national priorities. 0 4 No theory of the first amendment tolerates such
intrusions, even for more compelling purposes and effective means
than the courts have accepted here.2 6 5 To expose the restrictions on
speech inherent in the process is to pose the most fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of primary laws.
This, of course, is not the understanding the courts have given
to the primary issue. For the courts which have dealt with the constitutionality of primaries, the party was the people and the idea that
they had anything to say before the primary was not a concept the
courts entertained. If anything those courts saw party officers in opposition to the "true" party. Thus, their explanation that the primary aided the party.266 But that is to say that the courts substituted
ballots and levers for associated expression. The functions of organization in aid of speech-campaigning-were totally ignored in favor
of a relatively romantic notion of automatic unmediated expression
of popular will.
Together, the selection of officers and candidates, definition of
membership, and prohibition of support, leave the party as a formal
shell, perpetuating historic loyalties but staffed by people whose only
unified outlet is through behind-the-scenes influence. There are, of
course, other reasons for the decline of parties. But the primaries are
the essential link that has turned modern American political cam(constitutional dimensions of the neutrality of laws affecting first amendment rights).
263. See R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY
323-99 (2d ed. 1970).
264. Much of this individual development of issues is presented to the public through the
medium of direct mail, in which there is no public debate, but only a brief one-sided presentation. Impoverishing the discussion of public issues allows for the generation of political power
by means of slogans, personal favors with the bureaucracy, or loyalties based on group identification. See generally M. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977).
265. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); Bezanson, supra
note 120. See supra notes 2, 161, 262.
266.

See Riter v. Douglass, 32 Nev. 400, 420-21, 109 P. 444, 449 (1910); cases cited

supra note 54.
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paigns largely into media events.2 67 Political scientists have urged
structural support for, or reinforcement of, political parties, either
through the channeling of funds or other benefits. 26 8 But it is no
more appropriate under the first amendment to favor political parties
over other political actors. It is for the people, not the government, to
place their confidence in whatever type of association, if any, they
choose to support. 69
Having disenfranchised the party machinery itself through the
primary laws, we have not succeeded in replacing that large umbrella party machinery with any significant subordinate form of political organization.2 70 The primaries have been more congenial to
forms of individual personal political organization than to institutionalized and continuing political organizations. 7 Few states provide a place on the primary ballot for the identification of slates by
their sponsoring organization. 7 2 This may be either a cause or an
effect of weak subordinate political organizations. It also suggests
that the primary system may have struck deeper at the heart of the
-associational process than the registration of preferences. For if
subordinate political organizations are not themselves viable,273 very
significant damage has been done to the entire structure of the creative and promotive functions of the political parties.
267. See J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 20-22.
268. See HOUSE COMMITrEE ON ADMINISTRATION, 96TH

CONG., 1sT SEss., AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT, 1972-78 (Institute of Politics,

John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University) at vii-viii.
269. "[T]he censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Govemnment over the people." 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 933, 934 (1794) (statement of Mr. Madison).
270. See J.WILSON, THE AMATEUR DEMOCRAT 364-70 (1962).
271. See V.O. KEY, JR., supra note 7, at 169-96 (1956).
272. Many state statutes that designate the form of their primary ballot do not provide
for identification of the candidates' factions. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 14-1(b), 165(d) (Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 204D.08, .09 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. ELEC. LAW §
7-204(6) (McKinney 1978) (1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 891, § 29 that authorized the use of emblems by factions on primary ballots was repealed by 1913 N.Y. Laws ch. 820, §§ 29-30); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983); id. § 3010(c) (Purdon 1963); TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. art. 13.17 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983), construedin Dick v. Kazen, 156 Tex.
122, 292 S.W.2d 913 (1956). Slates accompanied by slate identifying designations are authorized by N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:23-17, -18, 19:49-2 (West 1964). See also Farrington v.
Falcey, 96 N.J. Super. 409, 233 A.2d 185 (1967). A few states allow the party endorsed
candidate to be so identified on the primary ballot. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-437 (West
Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 17-15-8 (1981). The related issue of the identification of
candidates for office to which candidates for delegate are pledged is discussed in Mandatefor
Reform, supra note 135, at 32,911.
273. See Banner, Updating the Parties' Membership Practices, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1979, at A19, col. 3, urging tangible membership benefits.
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2. The Question of CountervailingInterests.-If, however, parties can aggravate political corruption, and if primary laws minimize
that difficulty, the reigning approach to constitutional law requires
that we balance benefits and burdens in some form.274 That requires
a look at the evidence. Conventions can contribute to the problems of
corruption by aggravating the entrenchment of power in several different ways. First, by centralizing party machinery and giving it
some power over the individual candidates, the party becomes a possible focus for loyalties engendered through patronage, which are
then transferred from administration to administration and from
candidate to candidate over long periods of time. Second, the smaller
the entity the easier it is to control. Delegates to conventions can be
swayed for a variety of private and personal reasons. We envision
democracy as best reflected in the town meeting, but the town meeting creates relatively easy targets for manipulation or intimidation.
This risk probably varies inversely with the size of the community. A
citywide convention would probably be immune to threats that might
interfere with a convention of smaller districts within the city. This
is a feature of the greater checks and balances available in a larger
area and the risk of a relatively homogeneous and quiescent local
population in some small districts.
Third, conventions and other meeting systems created the difficult problems of counting ballots in the midst of masses of people-though honest convention ballots have seemed an attainable objective in the twentieth century. Conventions may be more
vulnerable to relatively subtle modern forms of corruption (graft,
bribery of elected officials) than primaries would be, though conventions may have been no more subject to older, rougher forms of political abuse (violence, bribery of those involved at the polls) than
primaries were. 5
We must distinguish, however, between control mechanisms
that restrict first amendment rights and control mechanisms that do
not. Remember that primary laws do several different
things-particularly, they restrict speech and provide a counting
mechanism. It is undoubtedly true that, divorced from a right to ballot position, the party could use a convention and a subsequent right
to speak on behalf of its nominees to compel some loyalty. That loyalty in turn can be used to shore up a corrupt regime. Nevertheless,
274. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
275. See Plunkitt's description of the changing forms of graft in W.

RiORDON,

PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL 3 (1963).
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we rarely permit the suppression of speech because of its possible
abuse.2 76 We, therefore, ought to seek justifications for primaries
which are unrelated to the control of expression.
The primary performs a role with respect to the parties which is
unrelated to expression by deflating the power that goes with automatic ballot status. While major party candidates automatically appear on the ballot, petitions with a set number of signatures are generally required for third party and independent candidates. 27 7 The
more difficult it is for competing parties and candidates to gain ballot status, the more the major parties control the choices available to
the voters at the general election. This is particularly important in
the one-party states-states in which one party has been so dominant that its candidates receive no serious challenge in the general
election. Limiting the statutory advantage of automatic ballot access
could be accomplished without any of the attendant prohibitions on
conventions, advocacy during the primary campaign, or even the appropriation of the party name at the primary. The petition route
could be made less onerous for third parties and independents, or
similar requirements could be imposed on the major parties. No
doubt other types of initial qualifying procedures could be developed
for similar purposes.
The legal advantages of the major parties also become less defensible to the extent that their leaders are permitted to function
independently of internal membership control. Control over the selection process of the major parties could be accomplished by means
of a delegate primary.
Any such system would screen access to the ballot. Any such
system would simultaneously preserve ballot access for other groups,
permit meaningful popular control, and reduce corruption of political
machines without the suppression of the current law. Most of the
benefits which the primaries have bestowed would be preserved by
these limited intrusions.
It is not at all clear, however, what role the primaries have
played in reducing the self-entrenchment of elected officials. First,
276. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 575
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 581-83 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that advocacy of disfavored activity is not proper ground of suppression; the separate opinions objected
to the Court's conclusion that commercial speech could be subjected to narrowly drawn restrictions based on their expected results); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Sere. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 530 (1980) (prohibiting abridgement of company's bill inserts based on their content).
277. E.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-142 (McKinney 1978). See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974).
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some of the benefits of the primary laws may flow merely from the
change in the counting mechanism, from party to public supervision
of the ballot. The number and identity of people willing to put some
effort into the purity of the process is crucial to the control of corruption, and the shift to public supervision may have taken advantage of that. Second, historically, the period of reform which gave
birth to the primaries also gave birth to a number of other changes,
most notably the secret ballot. Moreover, the various state legislatures considerably complicated the outcome by taking the same opportunity to strike back at the third party movements that had been
pestering them. This was done by elevating the hurdles that parties
and candidates had to surmount to have their names printed on the
ballot.278 In response to these enactments, the Supreme Court has
distinguished between laws that permit independent and presumably
278. Much of this legislation was in place by the early 1920's, though a second wave of
restrictive legislation ambushed Henry Wallace and the Progressives in 1948. See D.
MAZMANIAN, supra note 197, at 90-94. Methods of exclusion included early filing deadlines,
increases in the number of signatures on petitions required to put independent candidates on
the ballot, disqualification of previously affiliated voters from signing petitions, increases in the
number of votes at prior elections required to put a party on the ballot and, in some states, the
absence of any mechanism for new parties to gain access to the ballot. Id. See, e.g., People ex
rel. Breckton v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 221 I11.9, 77 N.E. 321 (1906), overruled on other
grounds In People ex rel. Lindstrand v. Emmerson, 333 III. 606, 165 N.E. 217 (1929). Though
some states retained relatively low ballot access percentages, see, e.g., 1893 Mass. Acts ch.
417, § 75 (party qualifies for ballot if it received 3% of total gubernatorial vote at preceding
election), the number of different devices by which parties were excluded, compounded by the
impact of the direct primary and the effect of exclusion in sister states took their toll. Even
where access was accomplished, as strong a candidate as Robert La Follette in 1924 was
unable to appear nationally under a single party banner. D. MAZMANIAN, supra note 197, at
92.
The new statutes made it even more difficult for weakened parties to regain their strength.
Few third party candidates have appeared on the ballot since 1920 except in presidential elections. See generally CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., GUIDE TO U. S. ELECTIONS 176, 397437 (R. Diamond ed. 1976); P. DAVID, PARTY STRENGTH IN THE UNITED STATES: 1872-1970,
at 32, 34, 45-46 (1972). David demonstrates a marked decline in third party strength beginning around 1920 (though the actual effects on state and local elections have been somewhat
masked by a composite index which incorporated the large vote for La Follette in the 1924
presidential election), and continuing into the 1960's. Id.
Ballot access provisions were not the only factors in the decline of third parties. The shift
from nominating conventions to direct nominating primaries may itself have been a major
barrier for small parties. See Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181 (1909), in which
the plaintiff third party sought to elect convention delegates rather than have the candidates
designated at a primary, as required by law. The Socialists helped to destroy themselves with a
series of factional splits, J. WEINSTEIN, THE DECLINE OF SOCIALISM IN AMERICA 1912-25, at
viii-x, 192-204 (1967), and a series of post-war Red scares helped to bury them, see F. ALLEN,
ONLY YESTERDAY 38-62 (1964); Farmer-labor parties confronted changing agricultural conditions, M. STEDMAN & S. STEDMAN, supra note 201, at 79, 81, 84, 90.
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third party candidates to qualify with some regularity, and those
that do not.279' This legislation has had three consequences. First,
while the parties were being "purified," their principal competitors
were being eliminated. Second, that result, in turn, may have helped
the political machines to persist. Third, that, in turn, obscured the
impact that the new secret ballot and registration laws might have
had, in combination with the earlier checks-and-balances or opencompetition approach.
Perhaps the most significant fact obscuring the role of primaries
in reducing the self-entrenchment of elected officials is that this wave
of reform legislation preceded by several decades the demise of most
of the notorious political machines. That denouement awaited the
1950's in many parts of the country. Thus, it is possible that primaries have been credited with influence that is properly attributed to
other changes in society. The impact of the secret ballot in making
bribery and intimidation more difficult, and of New Deal welfare
legislation in leaving people less vulnerable to party handouts, combined with the impact of two World Wars and a great depression on
social awareness, may have been substantially or entirely responsible
for diminishing the power of political machines.
Conversely, where entrenchment does continue, it appears to be
based on a continuation of patronage and a misuse of the bureaucracy. 80 Those factors appear to have more to do with political entrenchment than party structure as demonstrated by powerful personal organizations like the Long machine.2 81 Thus, though
association and the misuse of the machinery of government could be,
they are not necessarily related. Indeed, the ability of a political association to make its point publicly through proper channels may
limit its ability or tendency to employ corrupt means of self-perpetuation-the two may be inversely related since the restrictions on
speech and conventions throttle both opposition and incumbent
parties. 8 2
279.

Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1977); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,

742 (1974).
280.

See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); F. ROBINSON, MACHINE POLITICS

(1977).
281.

See generally T. WILLIAMS, HUEY LONG 753-59 (1969).

282. The utility of enabling the people to make an informed choice was demonstrated by
the decrease in cigarette sales that occured when both cigarette advertising and anti-smoking
commercials appeared on television. The cigarette industry responded by lobbying successfully

for congressional suspension of cigarette commercials. Upon the discontinuance of the public
debate, the sale of cigarettes again began to rise. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,
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In general, a large number of people depend on a small number
to organize their activities. The secret ballot protected individual autonomy by separating information regarding the vote of each person
from information regarding the total vote, at the cost, however, of
creating dependence on a rather smaller number of people who have
access to the voting machines themselves. For the same reasons
primaries are limited as devices for eliminating corruption by the
possibilities of rigging elections: intimidation, violence and bribery
remain possible. Honest primaries depend on a rather smaller number of crucial people, particularly poll-watchers and judges. 283 Pollwatchers, however, have been physically ejected for questioning
events.284 Primaries, moreover, duplicate many of the problems faced
by meetings. 85
Thus, identification of the effects of primaries on the prevalence
of corruption is made difficult by the combination of those problems
peculiar to primaries, those which it shares with meeting systems,
and the effects of many other statutory changes, including the secret
ballot, the voting machine, registration laws, and changes in civil
service, public contract and welfare laws.288 More difficult, perhaps,
but more important is to separate the different ways in which the
primary may have had that effect: through public supervision of the
ballot, through the definition of party membership, and through the
elimination of conventions.
Moreover, improvement has only been partial. Problems have
persisted despite checks and balances, secret ballots and primaries.
Given the frustration of these efforts at reform developed over two
centuries, Congress has continued to devise new strategies to deal
333 F. Supp. 582, 587-90 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting), affld, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
283. See State ex rel. Ward v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 186 La. 949, 173 So.
726 (1937) (entitling factions to participate in selection of poll watchers); Note, supra note
240, at 70-72.
284.

See A. STEINBERG, supra note 14, at 32; F. RoBnsoN, supra note 280, at 153-64,

232.
285. Questions of open or secret balloting arise in both the meeting and primary contexts. Problems with qualifications for election at meetings are similar to those that arise with
ballot access requirements, and credentials disputes are paralleled by the right to vote challenges. Questions of proxy and weighted voting at meetings are mirrored by absentee ballot
and apportionment issues in the primary context. Notice has also been implicated in the primary process when polling places have been changed. See Charbonnet v. Braden, 358 So.2d
360 (La. 1978), aff'd, 442 U.S. 914 (1979). Although primaries eliminated difficulties with
block voting, quorums, committee authority, and rule changes that arose in the meeting context, they have also created new areas for dispute, such as ballot position or write-in voting.
286. See J. HARRIS, supra note 240; Converse, supra note 14.
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with the popular hunger for purified government,287 adding to earlier
statutes aimed at reducing bribery, coercion and extortion. 288 The
Hatch Act prohibits government employee participation in politics as
a way of protecting them from the importunities of colleagues and
superiors and as a means of minimizing the impact of patronage on
the public election campaigns.2 89 These statutory decisions have been
underscored by the Supreme Court in Elrod v. Burns2 90 and Branti
v. Finkel,291 a pair of decisions in which the Court found a violation
of individual rights of conscience and association where government
employees were dismissed solely for partisan political reasons, with a
relatively narrow exception for positions involving a great deal of
personal and political trust and confidence between subordinate and
superior. The protections written by Congress did not suffice. 29 2 The
failure of these efforts is crucial because it set the stage for later
legal changes and because it illustrates the trade-offs that are inherent in this field. Manifestly, however, these problems relate to facets
of the political system which are independent of primaries.
V.

CONCLUSION

Political scientists have long debated whether the current disorganized state of American political parties reflects the "genius" of
our system or whether we ought to create unified parties on a British
model.29 3 It should be clear that the American party system has undergone enormous changes since Van Buren set the two-party system
on its course. Those changes reflect less an impermeable American
psyche with regard to parties than they do vast changes in the legislation under which the parties operate. Within limits, therefore, we
287. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
288. 18 U.S.C. §§ 597-601, 604-606 (1976); 18 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603, 607 (Supp. IV

1980).
289.

5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508, §§ 7324-7327 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). See also AMERI-

CAN LAW DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AND

37-54 (Chart C) (1976).
290. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
291. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
292. See generally R. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW § 1.4, at 1-38 to 145 (1977); Vaughn, Restrictions on the PoliticalActivities of Public Employees: The Hatch
Act and Beyond, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 516, 527-40 (1976).
293. Compare AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASS'N, COMMITTEE ON POLITICAL PARTIES, TOWARD A MORE REsPONSIBLE Two-PARTY SYSTEM (1951) (urging disciplined parties
STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW QUIcK-REFERENCE CHARTS

CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 157
(1971), and Turner, Responsible
Parties:A Dissentfrom the Floor, 45 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 143, 143-52 (1951) (taking a more
decentralized view of the political system).
on a British model)

(1975), C.

with E. GRIFFITH & F. VALEO,

ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 182
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can have whatever kind of party system we prefer.
First, with the possible exception of relatively small communities, conventions have a place. The analysis of the functions of the
right of association developed above, 294 suggests that the first amendment is not and ought not to be neutral among available alternatives.
This is not a matter merely of incidental restrictions on speech. Instead restrictions involved in the primary laws go to the very heart of
speech by association. If party power can be controlled without destroying the valuable functions parties can perform, that should be
our choice. Although it is consistent with those functions to provide
the membership of the parties with a method of control over the
party machinery itself, the parties ought to be able to choose either
to nominate candidates at conventions or to elect delegates at
primaries.
Second, given the importance of the functions parties can perform, only the most compelling purposes can justify intrusion, and
even then, only to the extent necessary to satisfy the purpose. Indeed
a firm exclusion against legislation which biases the content of political debate might be applied appropriately here.2 95 Third, in the face
of those conclusions, with the caveat noted above regarding small
communities, it is difficult to make the case that the primary laws
are responsible for controlling corruption or have significantly contributed to that goal.
Fourth, less restrictive means do appear viable. Indeed a satisfactory solution to the problem of political association is more likely
to be built on the founders' strategy of checks and balances than one
of restraint. It is plainly improper to justify the regulation of the
major parties on the ground that there are serious abuses in the
wake of the deliberate downgrading of the rights of the minor parties. They have, as the Court has recognized, an important role to
play.296 Easing ballot access, 297 including the third parties in cam294. Supra text accompanying notes 127-77.
295. See L. TRIBE, supra note 262, § 12-2, at 582-84.
296. "There is, of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the right to have people vote for or against them. Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms."
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 71, 97
(1976); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
297. See Elder, Access to the Ballot by Political Candidates, 83 DICK. L. REv. 387,
401-03 (1979). Despite the standards announced by the Court in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724, 742 (1974), the job of easing ballot restrictions to accomodate third parties has just
begun.
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paign presentations such as the televised debates, 29 8 reducing the discrimination in campaign funding,299 or otherwise providing them
with resources to make a true challenge to the major party candidates deserve more serious consideration.
If there is a need to put extra weapons in the hands of the party
membership, competing parties and factions can have greater opportunities to vie for power without eliminating the ability of the parties
to Imeet and promote candidates. For example, the names and emblems of subordinate political organizations that offer slates of candidates, such as the Regular or East Whatchamacallit Democratic
Club, could be placed on delegate primary ballots as is done for parties at the general elections;300 the neutrality of election boards
among party factions competing in such primaries can be protected.30 1 Such devices would offer voters a choice among associations rather than deny them the services that political associations
can perform.
Urging recognition for competing intraparty clubs may seem
more "reform" minded than urging a role for conventions. The clubs
do not benefit, however, from public defection from disorganized
parties.3 02 It is, moreover, no easier to play a constructive role in a
direct nominating primary (which requires total victory) than in a
delegate primary (which requires only a share of success). Indeed it
is easier to play the spoiler in a direct primary election. To avoid
that, groups must meet and negotiate a common strategy somewhere
in the process. Finally, there is no evidence that primaries or conventions are more hospitable to the growth of reform-minded clubs.
New York's clubs overthrew Tammany Hall before the primary law
was modified to thwart the convention. Changed attitudes after
World War II and the impetus of the Stevenson campaign have
298.

See generally Gottlieb, The Role of Law in the Broadcast of PoliticalDebate, 37

FED. B.J. 1, 19 (Winter 1978).

299. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (d) (1976) which discriminate against
independents who lack comparable funding sources, and 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(3) (1976) which
delays all funding for most minor parties until the conclusion of the election.
300. See statutes cited supra note 272. Where conventions are authorized, limitation of
the number of delegates per district may be an important supplement to provision for the

identification of slates in aid of improved voter selection. See W. Moscow, THE LAST OF THE
BiG TimE BossEs 120-21 (1971) (reducing the number of delegates required prior to DeSapio's
ascension, apparently for the purpose of democratizing the party). See also N.Y. ELEc. LAW §
2-102(1) (McKinney 1978).

301. See supra note 240.
302. The extent of that defection is discussed in N. NiE, S. VERBA & J. PETRocIK,
supra note 169.
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seemed better explanations for the growth of the reform
movement.303
We certainly cannot ignore the strong populist desire to exert
control over the parties as well as the general elections. But the parties can be permitted to select delegate primaries and those can be
strengthened. No doubt other features of the campaign process
might be strengthened, perhaps by providing a between-elections and
during-elections role to parties through media reform and tax credits. These are paths of a model of the first amendment right of association which emphasizes concepts of public choice and associational
access and entry. It should replace one which puts the government in
the role of restricting and channeling our thoughts.
Some political scientists draw very grave conclusions from the
dismantling of parties.3 ' It is possible to imagine another outcome,
one which conforms closely to the distinction made here between
speech and formal functions. James Banner has argued that the parties could resuscitate themselves by offering services to their membership.305 This may be unlikely because the candidates who now
control the parties often have little desire to strengthen the organization. Banner, however, points in the right direction, to the ideological
organizations on the horizon, e.g., the American Conservative Union,
though organization on the left has lagged behind that on the
right.306 It is possible that such groups will develop a large membership base, make nominations in fact and offer them to the voters in
the manner that parties did before party nominations were incorporated on printed ballots-as suggestions. But if that happens will we
make the same mistake and try to dismantle that opportunity to coalesce as well? Or is the need for parties felt strongly enough to challenge and survive our attempt to suppress it? It is an important ques303. See J. WILSON, supra note 270, at 52-58. There exists at least a perception that
World War II veterans refused to go along with the machinery of the two major political
parties and that the old machines declined because of that change in attitudes as well as the
New Deal welfare programs and general economic prosperity. See H. CAUDILL, THE WATCHES
OF THE NIGHT 217-18 (1976); H. PENNIMAN, SArT's AMERICAN PARTIES AND ELECTIONS 33841 (5th ed. 1952).
304. "Without limiting the president's claim to full personal popular authority, which
results in large measure from the way in which he is selected, we should not be too surprised
by the eventual recurrence of imperial tendencies in our highest office." J. CEASER, supra note
7, at 339. See also J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 15, 20-24.
305. Banner, supra note 273.
306. The emergence of such groups, however, has been relatively sluggish. For some of
the few successful examples, see F. CARNEY, supra note 17; J. WILSON, supra note 270, at 96-'
125; and Sorauf, supra note 253, at 695-99 (1954).
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tion, for the existence of a loyal opposition is closely associated with
the existence of competing political parties.3 07

307.

J.

KIRKPATRICK,

supra note 7, at 18.
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